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To My Wzfe 
Preface 
SO VERY much stranger than fiction is this narrative of the Rajk con-
spiracy that I feel it necessary to say a word about my sources. I 
have not invented, assumed, elaborated, or modified any of the facts 
in these pages. In the main, I have relied upon the official Blue Book 
Laszlo Ra;k and His Accomplices Before the People's Court, issued 
by the Hungarifln Government after the trial. This is an almost 
complete transcript of the proceedings, and I strongly advise anyone 
in whom my narrative may kindle some interest to obtain it (it is 
available in English). For the historical background to the trial and 
for information about Yugoslavia I have had recourse to newspapers 
and other usual reference sources. Where necessary I have quoted 
these sources. When drawing my own conclusions I have endeav-
oured to make perfectly clear the fact that they are my own. Where 
I mention the thoughts and feelings of the figures in the plot, I do 
so because in their own evidence at the trial they either described 
or betrayed them. 
I was present throughout the trial itself, and I have been fortunate 
in being able to consult many people who knew Rajk and his asso-
ciates well in the days before the discovery of the plot. But for any 
conclusions I have drawn from the facts of the case, I take full per-
sonal responsibility. 
Budapest, October 1949 Derek Kartun 
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I. 1944 - Betrayal 
THE YEAR 1944 was one of disaster for the armed forces of the German 
Reich. The year opened with the Red Army smashing and pound-
ing its way through the vast concentrations of Hitler's military 
machine on the Eastern Front, encircling town after town and 
reducing the German hedgehog position to rubble. By the summer, 
the Red Army found itself poised on the frontiers of Hungary, and 
the Germans were making frantic preparations to use the Hungarian 
capital as a defense bastion. In June the long-awaited second front 
in the West had opened, and the smaller German forces in France 
reeled back under the Anglo-American thrust. East and west, 
Hitler's Third Reich was crumbling. 
During that fateful year the underground Resistance movements 
which had worked and grown in every country from the beginning 
of the German occupation reached new heights of audacity and 
courage. In Hungary, as elsewhere, the Communist Party was the 
heart and soul of the illegal work. 
But though the scope of the work was extending steadily and new 
people were coming into the fight in increasing numbers in Hungary 
during 1944, the Resistance received some shattering blows. And 
these blows were surrounded in mystery. 
There was, for instance, the case of the mass escape from Satoral-
jaujhely prison, in the far north-eastern corner of the country. 
Satoraljaujhely was a jail for political prisoners only and there 
were both Hungarians and Yugoslavs there. It had seemed for a 
long time to the prisoners that the commander, a short balding man 
with a big bushy moustache, lieutenant of the reserve Lajos Linden-
berg, had extraordinarily good sources of information on what went 
on in the cells. There was an occaSlOn during 1943 when the 
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prisoners managed to smuggle in some political literature. Almost 
at once Lieutenant Lindenberg seemed to know of it and a cell 
by cell search led to the confiscation of the precious books. 
It was in January 1944, that a group of the prisoners first started 
planning a mass escape. During February details were discussed, and 
by the end of that month the proposals had become a plan. The 
brunt of the fight, for they knew that it would mean a costly fight 
with the guards, was to be taken by the Yugoslavs. Some 300 
prisoners in all were to take part. By early March all was ready 
and only the exact date remained to be fixed. 
It is not known whether the arrival of the Germans in Hungary 
on the 19th had any influence on the calculations of the leaders, 
but it was two nights later, on March 21, that the signal was given 
and the picked Yugoslav groups rushed the guards. In a few 
moments there was pandemonium throughout the jail. But within 
a few moments, too, it was clear that there had been a betrayal. 
For heavily armed pioneer units from a neighbouring camp appeared 
on the scene within minutes of the outbreak, and the prisoners 
found themselves suddenly outnumbered and being shot at from all 
sides. Even so, seventy-five of them manageq to reach the main gates 
and get through. It was then that the massacre started. Fifty-four 
of those who had got out were rounded up by the pioneers and 
the guards and shot on the spot. The remaining twenty-one were 
captured. The break had been a complete and bloody failure. Five 
days later the court-martial of the Hungarian Military Court arrived 
on the scene and sentenced another eleven to be hanged. 
All of the leaders of the movement inside the prison were thus 
wiped out. All, that is, except one. Andras Szalai, a member of the 
illegal Communist youth movement, had also been in the jail. He 
had known the details of the projected prison break. But ten days 
before it occurred, on March 11, he had been unexpectedly released 
by Lieutenant Lindenberg. 
As the Germans got settled in Hungary the work of the Resistance 
became more and more risky. To the savagery and efficiency of the 
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Szalasi government's political police were added the brutality and 
cunning of the Gestapo. Throughout that summer, however, the 
work of propaganda, sabotage, and resistance to the fascists continued. 
And the losses continued too. 
On the afternoon of July 27, two inconspicuous young men were 
sitting in the garden of the Nagy Bela pastry shop in Buda. It was 
a Sunday afternoon and the place, famous for its delicious pastries, 
was crowded with customers from the neighbouring middle-class 
districts. The two young men sat quietly beneath the trees in the 
very far corner away from the entrance. They did this because they 
wanted to have a clear view of the gate, and time enough to act 
should any unwelcome figure appear in it. They wanted, also, to 
attract as little attention as possible. 
One of the two was a handsome man of twenty-nine named 
Endre Sagvari. He was general secretary of the Communist youth 
movement in Hungary, and had been wanted by the police for years. 
The other was a member of his group with whom he had fixed an 
appointment at Nagy Bela. It was a favourite meeting place of his 
because it was crowded and also because it was not in a district to 
which the police normally paid much attention. 
Suddenly five figures in the uniform of the gendarmerie appeared 
in the doorway. Sagvari was a man who thought quickly. He knew 
that if he allowed himself to be captured he would be tortured, and 
perhaps die in the torture chamber as Ferenc Rozsa had died in 
1942. Rozsa had been one of the outstanding leaders of the Com-
munist Party. Or, if he survived torture without dying and without 
betraying his friends, he would be hanged, as Zoltan Schonherz, the 
former general secretary of the Communist Party in Hungary, had 
been hanged, also in 1942. Sagvari knew at once that the gendar-
merie were looking for him; that somewhere in his organisation 
there was a stool-pigeon who had betrayed the rendezvous. There 
was nothing to do but make a fight for it. As the gendarmes made 
their way between the crowded tables towards his corner, he drew 
his revolver. He killed two of them before he fell, his body full of 
bullets. His companion managed to fight his way out while the main 
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attention of the gendarmes was concentrated on Sagvari. 
It was a big loss for the illegal youth movement fighting against 
the Germans and the Hungarian fascists, and it has never been dis-
covered who gave the police the information about the meeting in 
the pastry shop. But one of the members of Sagvari's group was a 
pale, earnest young man with a high forehead and a dry, pedantic 
manner. His name was Andras Szalai, and he had not long been 
out of prison. 
During that year many people in Eastern Europe were having 
to make up their minds about the future. It had become clear that 
the Germans would not win the war. In Hungary, those who had 
served the old fascist regime of Admiral Horthy-and particularly 
those whose allegiance had been strong enough for them to continue 
to serve in the later, more openly Nazi period of the quisling gov-
ernment led by Szalasi-had a difficult decision to take. Were they 
to retreat with the German armies when the collapse started, in the 
hope that they would eventually meet the Americans coming from 
the West? Or were they to stay behind and take their chance with 
the Red Army? Both courses presented grave disadvantages for a 
man such as, let us say, George Palffy. 
Captain Palffy had always set his heart on a military career. Com-
ing from a banking family, he had studied at the Ludovika Military 
Academy, and had also spent a year in one of Mussolini's military 
institutions. There he had acquired a great admiration for the 
methods of Italian fascism. But though he dearly loved military life 
and had studied to be a staff officer, he had been forced to resign 
from the army in 1939 because his wife was of Jewish extraction. By 
1944 George Palffy was an embittered man. Restless, inordinately 
ambitious, a typical fascist officer of the Hungarian upper classes, 
George Palffy was looking for a sphere in which to shine. 
As far back as the winter of 1942 he had come to the conclusion 
that Germany would lose the war. He knew that Hitler could never 
recover from the disasters on the Don. And so by 1944, with the 
Red Army on Hungary's Eastern frontiers, Palffy was beginning to 
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look towards the Left. He believed that after the liberation there 
would probably be a strong Communist Party in Hungary-possibly 
a Communist Government. For an ambitious man, what could be 
better than to join the Communist movement now, before it had 
become easy and popular, and be there as a fully-fledged revolution-
ary at the liberation, one of the few with military experience? But 
to the cautious mind of George Palffy there were snags in this 
simple plan. Just supposing the Communists did not have the govern-
ment? Or supposing they did, and later there was a war or a coun-
ter-revolution and the Americans came in and put the Horthy 
groups back in power? 
If he, George Palffy, burned his boats and became a Communist 
right away, he would be finished for good should the Right stage 
a come-baek. More, remembering the savagery of the Hungarian 
officers in 1919, when thousands paid with their lives for the five 
months of wor ing-dass power, George Palffy realised very clearly 
indeed that he might even be risking his neck. 
Escape to the West then with the retreating Germans and put 
himself at the disposal of the American or British forces? Palffy 
knew only too well that emigre fascist officers would be ten a penny 
after the war. The best he could expect with the Americans was an 
exceedingly humble job officering riff-raff from the Horthy army 
which had accumulated in the West; and there would no doubt be 
an uncomfortable old age among the impoverished emigres of Paris 
or Brussels. 
To an ambitious fellow like Palffy, it all seemed gloomy and un-
satisfactory beyond belief. But supposing the Americans won? Sup-
posing there was another war between East and West, and the 
Hungarian emigres were brought back in triumph? In that case he 
might expect a job in the new fascist Hungary commensurate with 
his talents and his ambition. Yes, but how long would he have to 
wait meanwhile, on half pay in some miserable garrison town? And 
what guarantee had he that it would ever happen? 
It was a difficult problem, and not only George Palffy had to face 
it. Thousands like him were standing by the roadsides of Eastern 
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Europe, trying to judge which wagon to climb on to. Later many 
of them were to go into Social Democratic Parties. Some found 
their way into the Communist Parties, but the repeated cleansings 
to which the Communists rigorously subjected themselves after lib-
eration were generally too much for the Palffys. 
Palffy himself, perplexed as anyone might well be by such an 
exercise in political and military clairvoyance, consulted his old 
friend Captain Istvan Lancz. Lancz was still in the Hungarian 
Army at that time, but he too believed that the Germans were 
beaten. On the whole, Palffy and Lancz came to the conclusion that 
the brightest future in Hungary probably lay with the Communist 
Party. But these clever gentlemen were not so simple as to conclude 
from that fact that the thing to do was to attempt to get into the 
party right away. They worked out a far better plan. Lancz was to 
retreat to the West when the Hungarian Army in which he was 
serving started to move. He would make contacts with the British 
or Americans after the German surrender. Meanwhile Palffy would 
try to get into the Communist Party and work his way up as high as 
he could. Then, if the Communists finally won out, he, Palffy, 
would go witness for Lancz and bring him back into a lucrative 
job. And should the Western Powers win, Lancz could vouch for 
the Communist Palffy as a thoroughly reliable member of the Right 
who went into the Communist Party in order to spy for the Amer-
icans. Lancz, in fact, was to tell the Americans that George Palffy, 
member of the Hungarian Communist Party, held himself at their 
disposal for any assignment they might care to give him. 
The scheme was simple. Lancz covered for Palffy, and Palffy cov-
ered for Lancz. Whether democracy or fascism lost in Hungary, 
Palffy and Lancz would win. 
While the resistance movement was fighting its life and death 
struggle against the. police, with every die weighted against it, 
outnumbered, hunted, threatened with the worst sort of death that 
human ingenuity could devise, and while the supporters of the old 
regime such as George Palffy were laying their personal plans for 
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the future, a man was spending the months of 1944 in a Hungarian 
internment camp. He had been detained since October 1941, and it 
was not until October 1944 that he was finally released. But he was 
to remain free for only a few months. By the end of that year he 
had again been arrested, this time by the military counter-intelli-
gence department. At his own request his trial was held in closed 
court. As a result of evidence given by a number of distinguished 
police officials who came specially from Budapest to the tribunal at 
Sopronkohida, all the charges were dropped. But by then the debacle 
had started. Sopronkohida was evacuated. Beneath the repeated 
hammer blows of the Red Army the Hungarian front was crum-
bling. The quisling government of Szalasi fled from Budapest and 
the Red Army freed the city on February 13. The liberation of Hun-
gary was under way. 
Before there had been a chance to make his release effective, the 
man whose case had been heard so secretly at Sopronkohida was re-
moved with other prisoners to Germany. And there he did what 
George Palffy had done. He made plans to return to Hungary after 
the war, but he arranged with a friend to maintain contact with the 
Americans, in case the future had political surprises in store. The 
friend who was to stay in Western Germany and establish relations 
with the Americans and the emigre Hungarian fascists was named 
Istvan Stolte. The man whose case had attracted the attention of 
the authorities in Budapest was named Laszlo Rajk. At that time 
he was known in the Resistance movement as one of the finest mem-
bers of the Hungarian Communist Party. 
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2. The Swiss Group 
IN BOTH world wars Switzerland was used by all the main combat-
ants as an important centre of espionage. The choice is obvious. This 
little island of "neutrality" set in the raging seas of the European 
conflict was an ideal place from which to push out tentacles into 
enemy country. In the legations and consulates of Berne, Zurich, 
and Geneva, master spies framed instructions for their agents in 
every part of the continent. 
Outwards went the orders, and inwards came the espionage re-
ports: the number of ships seen during July in Genoa harbour; un-
expected building activity at a remote spot in the Hartz mountains; 
a crisis in the Italian or Hungarian Governments; troop movements 
on the Eastern Front. All of this, and more, greatly interested the 
British and American intelligence organs in Switzerland during the 
years of the Second World War. 
The Americans had set up the headquarters of their European 
espionage network in Berne under a far from commonplace legation 
official named Allan Dulles. Mr. Dulles had at one time been a 
banker and had played a prominent part in the elaboration of the 
famous Dawes Plan, which bolstered Germany's crumbling capi-
talist system and paved the way for Adolf Hitler. He was a well-
connected man; his brother, John Foster Dulles, was a leading Re-
publican and a confidant of Hoover, Taft, Vandenberg and many 
of the Democratic Party leaders in Washington as well. Mr. Dulles 
had at his disposal in Berne, Geneva, and Zurich unlimited quanti-
ties of money and an organisation which was not to be sneezed at. 
If anyone in Britain or the u.S. had known at that time that 
Mr. Dulles headed the Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.) in Eu-
rope, they would have described his job as espionage against the 
Germans and their allies. This, it is true, was part of his job. But 
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it was only a part. For Dulles and his superiors in Washington also 
had their eye on post-war Europe. By 1944 the Red Army was dem-
onstrating a frightening tendency to smash its way through the 
German lines into the heart of the continent. As it became clear 
that many European States would be liberated not by the Americans 
and British, but by the Russians, so the main emphasis of Mr. 
Dulles's work changed. 
By 1944 the American and British intelligence services in Europe 
were more concerned with espionage against the advancing Soviet 
forces and the Resistance movements which were welcoming the 
Red Army troops with joy and gratitude, than they were with the 
still powerful legions of Adolf Hitler. 
With this objective in mind, Mr. Dulles started during the 
summer of 1944 to concentrate special attention on the Hungarian 
emigres in Switzerland who called themselves the Swiss Group of 
the Hungarian Independence Front. :The British and U.S. Intelli-
gence services had been active for years among such groups of East-
ern European expatriates, but with the certain knowledge that the 
Red Army would liberate these countries, the emigres not unnatu-
rally took on an added importance. 
They did not present Allan Dulles with a particularly formidable 
task. They were woolly and generally reactionary in their political 
ideas and anxious at all costs to end the dreary life of emigration and 
get back home to good business and the coffee houses of Budapest. 
All of them came from middle-class homes; many were thoroughly 
reactionary Right-wing Zionists who had been driven from Hun-
gary by the anti-Semitic policy of the Horthy regime; all of them 
were profoundly anti-Soviet and intoxicated by the glitter and ease 
with which the U.S. officials in Geneva surrounded themselves. 
There was not a single Communist among them. 
To the Americans, the Hungarians were easy meat. For several 
years they had been accepting "relief" from a body calling itself the 
Unitarian Service Committee. The head of this committee was an 
American agent named Noel H. Field, who, according to evidence 
later given in court, specialised in contacting members of the Left 
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for espionage' work. Field's technique was to talk vaguely Left-wing 
politics until he had gained his victim's confidence in sufficient de-
gree to be able to form an estimate of his views and character. In 
those cases where an appeal on ideological grounds failed to enroll 
him as an American agent, the victim might be confronted with the 
receipts which he had signed in exchange fOJ~ the financial assistance 
of the Unitarians. He would be told that, suitably used, these might 
cause him no end of trouble with the authorities after he had re-
turned home. 
A combination of these techniques was used during 1944 to 
strengthen the ties between the O.S.S. and the Hungarian emigres. 
The leader was a physician named Tibor Szonyi, and he had in 
his group about a dozen fellow Hungarians. 
Among Szonyi's many contacts in Zurich and Geneva were Noel 
H. Field and a Yugoslav named Misha Lompar. This Lompar was 
the leader of the Yugoslav groups of emigres just as Szonyi was 
leader of the Hungarians. By the beginning of 1944 Szonyi knew 
Lompar well and had fallen under his political influence. On 
Lompar's advice, he started to educate his group politically along 
pro-American lines. 
The group was preparing itself, not only to return to Hungary 
after the Liberation, but to join the Communist Party there in order 
to disrupt it from the inside. They were provided by Lompar and 
Field with copies of the two books by Earl Browder, Teheran, and 
Victory and After. Browder had not yet been expelled from the 
general secretaryship of the American Communist Party, and his 
theories were currently playing havoc with the Communist move-
ment in the U.S. He preached a theory of long-term collaboration 
between workers and the "progressive" industrialists and bankers, 
which would have emasculated the revolutionary movement. The 
U.S. intelligence service understood immediately the value of the 
Browder theories in confusing and paralysing the European Com-
munist parties, and had distributed in Switzerland large numbers 
of the Browder books, translated into Italian and French. The 
Szonyi group, in common with others, held discussion classes 
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around the ideas of Browder under the approving gaze of the Ameri· 
can Legation. 
In September of 1944, Field told Szonyi that he would put him 
in direct personal touch with the boss, and during that month 
Szonyi met Allan Dulles for the first time. From then onwards he 
no longer received his orders from Field's office at 39 Quai Wilson, 
in Geneva, but direct from the U.S. Legation in Berne. 
Immediately prior to the September meeting, however, Szonyi and 
one of his closest associates, Ferenc Vagi, had worked out a mem-
orandum on the political future in Hungary, in which they 
expressed their willingness to co-operate with the U.S. intelligence 
service. This was sent to Allan Dulles via Misha Lompar, the 
Yugoslav. 
By the end of November Szonyi had been formally enrolled as a 
U.S. agent-Dulles gently waving at him the receipts he had earlier 
given Field for "financial assistance." The Americans never relied 
on a man's ideas to bind him to them: they always liked to possess 
something with which they could blackmail him, too. It was, of 
course, safer that way. 
At the November meeting, Szonyi received instructions to prepare 
his group for the return to Hungary. He was told that the journey 
across Europe would be arranged by the Americans. This journey, 
which took place in the early months of 1945, is one of the most re-
markable and sinister incidents of the war. 
Six members of Szonyi's organisation were selected to return 
home in the first operation-Ferenc Vagi, George Demeter, Gyula 
Kuti, Andras Kalman, Janos Dobo, and Tibor Szonyi himself. 
After a final interview with Dulles in December, the machinery 
was put into operation. From Noel Field they received 4,000 Swiss 
francs to facilitate the illegal crossing of the French frontier. Misha 
Lompar, who appeared to be a man of infinite resource, and had by 
then become Yugoslav Consul in Zurich, produced forged papers 
showing the six Hungarians to be Yugoslav officers returning to 
Yugoslavia as an official delegation. Lompar also provided a confi-
21 
dential letter addressed to the Ministry of the Interior in recently 
liberated Belgrade. This letter, he told Szonyi, described the group 
as American agents returning to Hungary, and requested the help 
of the Yugoslav authorities. 
Presumably, Szonyi and his friends were beginning to realise by 
now that far from being an American agent secretly working 
against the interests of the new Yugoslav administration and the 
Yugoslav Communist Party, Misha Lompar was in fact working on 
instructions from Belgrade. It even seemed as if the Belgrade a u-
thorities themselves were also working for the Americans. But this 
was fantastic. Hadn't they already publicly declared themselves as 
outspoken supporters of Socialism ? Were they not known to be 
highly suspicious of British and U.S. intentions in Europe? Didn't 
they eulogise the Soviet Union on every conceivable occasion? And 
was not the Yugoslav Communist Party regarded as a model by 
Communists in every part of Europe? 
It is not known what view Dr. Szonyi and his five friends took 
of these mysteries. At all events, they were entrusting their lives to 
the Yugoslav authorities, and they were known to those authorities 
as American agents whose mission was to infiltrate into Hungary, 
behind the lines of the Red Army, and carryon espionage there for 
the American secret service. 
The group rapidly reached Marseilles, where they reported to the 
Yugoslav Consul-General, Latinovich. They received a further batch 
of forged documents, and after some negotiation between Latino-
vich and the G2 section of the U.S. Army Headquarters in Mar-
seilles, a U.S. military plane was placed at their disposal. They flew 
to Naples, and thence direct to Belgrade. 
In the Yugoslav capital, still festive and breathless from the recent 
liberation by the Red Army, they were driven straight to the Minis-
try of the Interior. Lompar's letter was handed in and immediately 
produced a remarkable result. They were passed on to a Major 
Nikolai Kalafatich. And Major Kalafatich was a high official in 
O.Z.N A.-Tito's political police. 
At once, Szonyi went into conference with Kalafatich, who told 
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him that information collected in Budapest for the Americans 
should be handed to Colonel Obrad Cicmil, who was Yugoslav rep-
resentative on the Allied Control Commission in the Hungarian 
capital. Cicmil would then transfer the reports to him, Kalafatich, 
in Belgrade, and thence they would travel by official courier to La-
tinovich in Marseilles, and on, via Lompar, to Allan Dulles in the 
Berne Legation. It was already clear to Szonyi that there was no 
telling where the Yugoslav intelligence service ended and the Amer-
ican began. 
The conference concluded, the group was provided with an 
O.Z.N.A. car, and travelling via Novisad and Subotica, they reached 
the Hungarian town of Szeged. 
At Szeged they destroyed their documents. The first section of 
their assignment had been successfully accomplished: they had pen-
etrated behind the lines of the Red Army. They were in liberated 
Hungary, where no one knew their connections with the U.S. in-
telligence service. They were ready to go into action as American 
spies. And it was Marshal Tito's intelligence service which had 
made it possible. 
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3. The Past of Laszlo Rajk 
LASZLO RAJK, who spent the fateful year 1944 in internment, was 
a complex character. His overweening pride was matched only by 
an ambition which knew no bounds. Of great physical charm, he 
was tall, with a sensitive, intensely serious face which would easily 
break into a boyish smile. This boyishness gave his personality a 
quite exceptional frankness. But he also had the eyes and mouth of 
an ascetic. He was very attractive to women, and men responded to 
his compelling personality. 
Rajk managed to keep his pride and ambition hidden well 
enough, and there was another trait in his complex character that 
he also managed to conceal. He was a coward. 
It was simple cowardice that led him in 1931 to enlist in Horthy's 
political police as an informer and agent provocateur operating in 
the ranks of the illegal Communist movement. He had been arrested 
together with other university students over a matter of the distribu-
tion of Communist leaflets. Rajk was taken to the headquarters of 
the political police in Budapest. Presumably terrified at the rough 
treatment usually reserved for political suspects, he confessed every-
thing at once and promptly gave away everyone of his companions. 
But he was luckier than those who had been caught with him. 
For he had an elder brother who was a police officer, and this 
brother asked the political department to treat him leniently. 
Further, his brother-in-law, a certain captain of police Lajos Bokor, 
was also brought into the affair. The scene in the office of Imre 
Hetenyi, chief of the political department, on that autumn day in 
1931 was to leave its impression on the history of Europe. But to 
those who took part, it was only the enrolling of another police spy, 
a small-time stool-pigeon in the working-class movement. 
A paper was presented to Rajk and he was requested to sign. This 
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paper stated his willingness to inform the police on the activities of 
the Communist movement. Glad enough to get off so lightly, Laszlo 
Rajk signed, and in signing he gave evidence of yet another deform-
ity in his character. For in addition to pride and cowardice, a total 
lack of principle blighted the personality of this reIl!arkable youth. 
Rajk was entering into a long tradition of European adventurers. 
Henceforth he would be working for the political police of Horthy's 
fascist Hungary. But Rajk was not the sort of traitor who betrayed 
because he believed in the principles of his secret masters. Rajk be-
lieved in nothing but himself. He betrayed because he was terrified, 
because he had contempt for his fellow men, and because his flighty, 
unbalanced personality welcomed the thrill of playing a double 
game. He had the character of the international adventurer, the 
cosmopolitan. And international adventurer he would now become. 
Laszlo Rajk's political and moral degeneration followed rapidly 
and logically from his first betrayal. Within a year he had de-
nounced the Communists at the university to the police, and mass 
arrests took place. Among those arrested were Rajk himself, in order 
to allay suspicion among his friends, and that Istvan Stolte who 
thirteen years later was to carry such an important message to 
Western Germany for Rajk. Stolte himself was also working for the-
police in 1932, and his activities were revealed a year later and he 
was expelled from the Communist Party. 
It was in 1932 also that Rajk first came into contact with Dr. Jo-
seph Sombor-Schweinitzer, at the time a first counsellor in the 
police, but destined to become Hungary's police chief. The name is 
important because many years later Sombor-Schweinitzer was to 
play a curious role in European politics. 
Rajk continued his petty police spying until the end of 1934, when 
Hungarian fascism took a sharp turn for the worse with the estab-
lishment of the Gombos Government. Gombos was determined to 
smash what working-class organisation there was, and Rajk, the 
last link in the chain of operations, was sent into the building 
workers' union as a spy. 
The industrial workers of Budapest, led by the militant builders,. 
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were putting up the fight of their lives against the Gombos decrees, 
and the atmosphere was heating up towards a general strike. Early 
in 1935 the threatened strike broke out, but by then Rajk had 
wormed his way into the building workers' leadership. He proposed 
a mass meeting, although meetings were strictly forbidden by the 
government: the builders accepted and a huge demonstration took 
place in the Ujlipotvaros in Budapest. According to a prearranged 
plan, the police smashed their way into the crowd of workers and 
arrested 200 of them. It was the end of the strike. 
In 1936, on the instructions of Sombor-Schweinitzer, Rajk went 
to Czechoslovakia with orders to get into the Communist Party 
there. But world-shaking events were now to sweep up this insig-
nificant agent of the Hungarian police and fling him into the midst 
of the whirlpool. 
In 1933 Adolf Hitler had come to power. Early in 1936 an obscure 
Spanish officer of fascist convictions named Francisco Franco was 
plotting with a cabal of military men, millionaires, and priests to 
overthrow the newly founded Spanish Republic. On July 17 the war 
in Spain broke out, and at once Hitler and Mussolini made it their 
war. To Spain they sent dive-bombers, arms, military missions, 
and fighting troops. And to Spain the working class of the world 
sent its finest fighters to defend democracy in this, its first battle 
against fascism in Europe. 
Rapidly the International Brigade was formed, and from Britain, 
America, France, Italy, Yugoslavia, Hungary and many other lands 
contingents began to go forth along devious, secret routes to em-
battled Spain. Among those organising the hazardous recruitment 
and despatch of men from Eastern Europe was a certain J osip Broz, 
who took the name of Walter, and later called himself Tito. Among 
the hundreds of Hungarians who answered the call was Laszlo 
Rajk. He had been ordered to Spain by Sombor-Schweinitzer with 
a two-fold mission. He was to discover the names of the members 
of the Rakosi Battalion, as the Hungarian unit was to be called; 
and he was to reduce its military efficiency by political disruption. 
The battles in Spain ebbed to and fro for weary months as the 
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fight against the farce of non-intervention went on throughout the 
world. Slowly, under the overwhelming pressure of the German 
dive-bombers and Italian arms, the forces of democratic Spain 
were pushed back. In battle after battle they were outgunned and 
outnumbered. And so, in the fateful month of November, 1938, 
came the Ebro. 
By then Rajk had become Communist Party secretary of the 
Rakosi Battalion, and it was in this capacity that he instituted dis-
ciplinary proceedings, immediately before the Ebro battle, against 
one of the Battalion's officers, named Haas. The aim was to produce 
political conflicts and animosity and so reduce the morale of the 
unit. Many years later, Rajk was to admit that in his opinion this 
manoeuvre did reduce the unit's fighting efficiency on one of the 
most important sectors in one of the decisive battles of the Spanish 
War. 
By February of 1939 it had become clear to Rajk that the Spanish 
Republic had lost its war against Hitler and Mussolini. Madrid was 
hard-pressed and was to fall at the end of March. Raj k deserted his 
unit and crossed the border to France, where he was interned in St. 
Cyprien camp. Later he was transferred to Gurs, and later to the 
camp at Vernet. 
At Vernet he met Enrique Gironella, deputy secretary-general of 
P.O.U.M. (the Spanish Trotskyist Party), who had escaped from a 
death sentence delivered by the People's Court in Barcelona and was 
later helped by the French secret service to reach Mexico. Rajk also 
met a number of leading Yugoslav Trotskyists. A Trotskyist group 
existed, too, among the Hungarians, and in this group there was a 
man called Cseresnyes, who was to appear in a surprising role later 
on. 
Rajk carried on Trotskyist propaganda in the camps, together 
with these individuals, and in recalling the event ten years later he 
was to describe this Trotskyism as "the refutation and disruption of 
everything which is in the interests of the revolutionary working-
class movement, on a political basis that completely lacked all prin-
ciple." It remains a good enough description for our purposes. 
27 
Both at Gurs and Vernet the French authorities were aware of 
Rajk's activities, and he was interrogated several times by an officer 
of the French intelligence service, the Deuxieme Bureau. With this 
Deuxieme Bureau officer a ridiculous comedy was played. The Hun-
garian Trotskyists such as Rajk were busy providing the names of 
the Yugoslav Trotskyists. And the Yugoslav Trotskyists, for their 
part, were doing the same for the Hungarians. In this way the 
French intelligence service was able to compile a double-checked, 
watertight list of people who would act as police spies and 
provocateurs. 
While these unsavoury proceedings were under way in the camps, 
Spain's heroic fight had ended on March 31, 1939. But within a few 
months the new rumblings in Europe had broken into a deafening 
roar, and the Germans had driven through Poland. In the West the 
phoney war was on, to be ended during the summer of 1940 with 
the destruction of the French Republic and the occupation of 
Northern France. In the South, the senile old reactionary, Petain, 
was placed on a precarious pedestal and held there by permission 
of Adolf Hitler. 
Now once again history was to pick Laszlo Rajk from the filth 
and obscurity of Vernet camp and thrust a new role upon him. He 
was to be taken from his humble political intrigues among the Span-
ish war veterans and made once more into a police spy. 
During the spring of 1941, Hitler was perfecting his giant war 
machine in readiness for his projected assault against the Soviet 
Union in June. From every corner of Europe workers were being 
impressed to work in the German war factories. Frenchmen, Bel-
gians, Dutchmen, Poles, Hungarians, Czechs were being threatened 
and cajoled by their respective puppet governments or by the Ger-
man Gauleiters to come to Germany. And within this Europe-wide 
plan for slavery figured the camps where the Spanish veterans had 
been rotting for over two years. 
To Vernet, then, came a German commission. Within a few days, 
Rajk found himself in the office of the German major in charge. 
He was told that his name had been handed to the Gestapo by the 
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head of the political department of the Hungarian police, in whose 
office he had signed the fateful paper eight years before. 
Rajk was to be returned to Hungary to continue his work for the 
police there. And he was to be returned on the orders and with the 
indispensable help of Hitler's Gestapo. Having worked for eight 
years for the Hungarian police, Rajk extended his connections that 
day in the office at Vernet, to the Nazi police services. 
It is interesting to note in passing that in the course of his talks 
with the German major, Rajk was asked for, and gave, information 
about the Yugoslav Trotskyists. It was clear to him that he was not 
the only internee who was to be helped to get out by the Nazis. It 
is also interesting to observe that among the Hungarians released by 
the Germans at this time was an individual named Imre Gayer, an 
international adventurer who had come to Spain from South Amer-
ica but had never seen a shot fired in anger during his service with 
the International Brigade. This Imre Gayer was later to be respon-
sible for some of the most serious losses suffered by the Hungarian 
Resistance movement during the whole course of the war. Like Rajk 
he was a police agent, and they traveled back to Hungary via Ger-
many together, reaching Budapest in the month of August 1941. 
Immediately on his return Laszlo Rajk did two things. He re-
ported to police headquarters, and he got in touch with the illegal 
Communist Party. To the Communists he gave a rose-coloured ac-
count of his activities in Spain, and introduced Imre Gayer to them 
as a thoroughly trustworthy member of the party who could be re-
lied upon to check the homecoming members of the Rakosi 
Battalion. He himself was interned by the police to cover him in 
case Gayer's activities should arouse suspicion. 
And thus Rajk spent the grim years between 1941 and 1944 in the 
comparative comfort of a Hungarian internment camp on special 
regime. Meanwhile, Imre Gayer was at work, and according to 
Rajk's later evidence in court it was Gayer who brought about the 
large-scale arrests of 1942 and the death of Ferenc Rozsa and Zoltan 
Schonherz. 
In October 1944, Laszlo Rajk was released from internment and 
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instructed to infiltrate once more into the Resistance movement, 
where his reputation as an outstanding fighter was, of course, intact. 
But it often happens that the policemen attached to one government 
department do not know what the policemen attached to another 
are doing. And so it proved in this case. 
Over-zealous by half, the Hungarian military counter-intelligence 
department seized Rajk as a dangerous member of the Under-
ground, and clapped him into jail. And thus it was, at the end of 
1944, that he appeared in closed court at Sopronkohida, and found 
himself once again picked up by the giant stream of events and de-
posited, in the last nightmare days of the war, in Germany. And 
there, as we have seen, he made his arrangement with his old friend 
and fellow-spy, Istvan Stolte, to contact the Americans while he, 
Rajk, returned in due course to Hungary. 
In the intervening years, Sombor-Schweinitzer, whom we first 
met as a counsellor of police back in Budapest in 1931, had become 
chief of police to the fascist puppet government of Szalasi. Together 
with the braided officials of the Hungarian fascist state, Sombor-
Schweinitzer found himself by the end of 1944 fleeing westwards for 
his life before the advancing tanks of the Red Army. It was to Som-
bor-Schweinitzer that Rajk told Stolte to go. He had heard that the 
Hungarian super-policeman was "somewhere near Munich" with 
the Americans. 
Throughout the summer and autumn of 1945 the faithful Stolte 
searched. He was able, without much difficulty, to get across into 
American-controlled territory, and finally, in December, he found 
Sombor-Schweinitzer in the little town of Traunstein in Upper Ba-
varia. There the old servant of fascist Hungary and close collabo-
rator of the German Gestapo was installed as chief of the Hungarian 
section of the American intelligence service (C.I.C.)! Stepping 
straight from the servi<:e of the fascists to that of their supposed op-
ponents, Sombor-Schweinitzer was engaged, under the orders of 
his new bosses, upon exactly the same work as he had performed for 
his old ones. He was selecting and training political agents to be 
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sent into the progressive movement in Liberated Hungary. The 
rather hasty switch in allegiance had necessitated no change in the 
simple ideology of Dr. Joseph Sombor-Schweinitzer. A fascist polit-
ical police officer he had been under Horthy and Szalasi and Hitler. 
And fascist political police officer he remained under the American 
High Command. 
It is not surprising that Stolte was received with warmth by Som-
bor-Schweinitzer and the Americans at Traunstein. He was closely 
questioned about Rajk, and told that a way could be found "to make 
use of him." 
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4· Budapest, 1945 
THE BUDAPEST to which Laszlo Rajk returned in the spring of 1945 
was scarred and blasted by the eight weeks of stubborn fighting in 
the city's streets. But for the working people it was a joyous place 
to be. 
At last the Germans had gone, and with them the hated Szalasi 
Government. The most arrogant supporters of the old Hungarian 
fascist regime were either in Germany or in hiding inside Hungary, 
or at any rate preserving a discreet silence. In the streets of the city 
walked groups of Red Army soldiers-the men who had brought 
freedom to Hungary after exactly thirty years of oppression. For 
the common people then, 1945 was a year of hope and enthusiasm. 
F or the bourgeoisie, of course, things were otherwise. They had 
not yet had time to recover from the blow of being liberated by the 
Red Army instead of by the Americans. The simpler souls among 
the businessmen and State functionaries viewed the future with un-
mitigated gloom. But the more ingenious and sophisticated among 
them had not given up hope. 
Were there not British and U.S. Legations now in Budapest? 
Weren't there new "democratic" parties and "democratic" politicians 
who talked socialism in public and capitalisJ.I1 in private ? Would 
there not be elections which could be won by "left" coalitions of 
Social-Democrats and assorted varieties of "left" Peasants and Lib-
erals? Certainly, the Communist Party commanded an uncom-
fortably large body of support among the working peo'ple. But 
these things could be fixed. They had been fixed many times before, 
and the ruling classes in Hungary believed in 1945 that they had not 
lost their old cunning and resource. Nor had they lost all their old 
friends. 
For their part, the Communists were forging ahead. For the first 
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time in thirty years the party was legal. From the obscurity of the 
dangerous underground movement there emerged the men and 
women who had represented the true Hungary in those dark years. 
From Moscow there came back some of the outstanding Hungarian 
Marxists, chief among them Matyas Rakosi, the party's general 
secretary, and Erno Gero. 
By leaps and bounds the party's strength and prestige grew. And 
with this development its responsibilities grew also. Hundreds of 
important jobs had to be filled in the party structure, and soon in 
the Government and Ministries. Yet there were only a few thousand 
left alive after the dark years. Everyone who showed ability and 
trustworthiness and a willingness to sacrifice himself to the arduous 
work required of a Communist Party member was given a job. 
It was not surprising in these circumstances that Laszlo Rajk's rise 
in the party should be rapid. His police activities were completely 
unknown to the party members. The incidents in the Rakosi bat-
talion in Spain were shrouded in such obscurity and confusion that 
Rajk had no difficulty in passing them off. In fact, he was popularly 
regarded in 1945 as one of the most valuable members of the party. 
Within a few weeks of his return he had been appointed to the post 
of secretary of the Budapest Communist Party organisation. 
At this time Laszlo Rajk was at the height of his powers. Aged 
only 36, handsome, facile, and with easily discernible intellectual 
qualities, his popularity increased day by day. It was to be discovered 
later that Rajk was neither as intelligent nor as able as superficial 
knowledge led people to suppose. Beneath the apparent brilliance of 
three-hour speeches delivered without notes, a Napoleonic memory 
for the names and careers of his most inconspicuous subordinates, 
and an easy and knowledgeable manner with every type of person, 
the old weaknesses of character remained. And fundamentally, there 
were weaknesses of mental grasp and knowledge of Marxism which 
were to become obvious later and to give rise to the first suspicions 
among his closest colleagues. 
But at that time, in 1945, the years of sordid police spying were 
over. No longer would he be forced to go in and out of jail, to take 
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menial and distasteful jobs in order to write his police reports, to 
accept his orders from gross and stupid police officials. If Laszlo 
Rajk had bttn a petty spy before, at last his reward was at hand and 
he was to be an adventurer in the heroic mould. Before him opened 
the pleasant vista of high office, with its comfort and popularity, 
combined with the thrill and degraded fascination of the double 
game. 
Indeed, it is possible at this stage that for Rajk the intoxication of 
the game itself played as large a part as anything else in the motiva-
tion of his conduct. It can hardly be said that he betrayed the 
Hungarians because he loved the American bankers more. It is 
doubtful whether Rajk had ever seriously considered which side he 
agreed with. But he loved himself and the role he had chosen, and 
at the same time he always considered the possibility that one day, 
in some way, the Right would win again. A man had to take pre-
cautions against such an all-embracing development. 
It was not until a little later that the glittering hope of becoming 
dictator of Hungary began to seize hold of the one-time back-street 
informer. 
At this point it is necessary to pick up once again the story of 
some of the men we have already met. 
Tibor Szonyi and his group from Switzerland had safely emerged 
in Hungary as loyal Hungarian democrats with a considerable 
smattering of Marxism-ready everyone of them to go into the 
Communist Party. They proceeded to join, and by the middle of 
1945 Szonyi was holding a position of some importance at the party's 
headquarters. It must be remembered that the party was desperately 
short of personnel, and that Szonyi and his friends were carefully 
briefed in the role they were to play-that of persecuted and secret 
Communists of long standing. 
From his position at headquarters, Szonyi worked his associates 
into the party organisation. Vagi went to the press, and later to the 
press department of the Prime Minister's office; Kalman got an 
important job at the Ministry of People's Welfare; Demeter was sent 
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into industry and ended up at the Institute of Technology. Later, 
as further members of the Swiss group returned home, they too were 
put into positions from which they could carryon valuable 
espionage. 
In addition to deploying his forces, Szonyi held secret meetings of 
his group at his flat or at the homes of Kalman or Demeter. The 
Szonyi spy ring was thus in a high state of organisation by the end 
of 1945. 
Then there was the dry, humorless young man who had been 
responsible for the massacre at the Satoraljaujhely prison the year 
before (for Andras Szalai had given away the plans for the jailbreak, 
as we shall soon see). 
This man Szalai also managed to deceive the Communist Party 
and become an open member. And he too got an important job-
in the party's propaganda department. But for the moment, indeed 
for the first time in his adult life, Szalai was not in touch with the 
police, for the simple reason that he had no means of establishing 
contact. It was not until the following year, 1946, that he was to 
resume his role of police spy. 
We left George Palffy, the ambitious former officer of the Horthy 
army, seeking a way into the Communist Party during 1944, as the 
German armies reeled back westwards. So well did Palffy work 
that we find him now, in 1945, as the chief of the political depart-
ment of the new Hungarian army. During 1945 Palffy and Rajk 
first met ea.ch other. They got on well, and by countless almost 
imperceptible hints mutually exchanged, they conveyed to each 
other that they held similar political views and that they saw noth-
ing profitable in the new regime, the Popular Democracy, which 
was being built up in Hungary. It was not until later, in 1946, that 
this hinting and feeling out of each other's views developed into an 
open political alliance. 
At this point, too, mention must be made of a certain Lieutenant 
Bela Korondy, a stiff-necked, haughty, and ambitious young officer, 
typical product of the Ludovika Military Academy of Horthy's 
Hungary. In August 1945, this unpleasant young man joined the 
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political department of the army and met Palffy. Palffy at that time 
was a colonel. His instructions to Korondy in those early days were 
to clear as suitable for the new democratic army as many of the old 
fascist officers as he could. Only those whose guilt was too mon-
strous or too infamous to be hidden were proceeded against. Thus 
Palffy and Korondy started the work of building up an army which 
would be hostile to the new Hungary and would lend itself one day 
to the purposes of the counter·revolution. 
It was in the late summer of that year that the mission of Istvan 
Stolte in the American zone of Germany bore fruit. We have seen 
that he found Dr. Joseph Sombor·Schweinitzer and had been told 
that a use would be found for his friend, Laszlo Rajk. Since that 
time the American organisation had been at work. And thus it was 
that Rajk was contacted in Budapest some time in August or Sep-
tember by Lieutenant-Colonel George Kovach, a member of th~ 
American Military Mission, later to become U.S. military attache in 
the Hungarian capital. 
Kovach did not mince his words. He had instructions for Rajk, 
he said, from his former chief Sombor·Schweinitzer. Rajk was to 
place himself at the disposal of the American intelligence service. 1£ 
he refused to do so, he would be denounced to the Hungarian Com-
munist Party. But Rajk did not need threats of this description. 
The double game had become second nature to him. It was both an 
insurance against political changes in the future, and the supremely 
fascinating pastime of a man who deemed himself cleverer than his 
fellows. Kovach did not have to insist. 
Raj k, he declared, would not be assigned the duties of a small-time 
agent. Top-level political information was what the u.S. intelligence 
service wanted of him. And the first job of this character performed 
for the Americans by Rajk was concerned with the elections which 
took place in Hungary in November 1945. "It was of special im-
portance to them," he declared afterwards. 
Later, when he came to tell Kovach that various Right-wing 
parties, including the Right of the Social Democrats, were organising 
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the infiltration of reactionaries into key posts in the factories and 
the State machine, Kovach replied that he knew all about it already 
-in fact the whole scheme was being organised and directed by the 
Americans. 
This, then, was Laszlo Rajk, the man who had started as a police 
spy for the Hungarian fascist government, and now had graduated 
via the German Gestapo to become an American intelligence agent. 
The progression throws a good deal of light, not on Rajk, whom we 
know well enough by now, but upon the Americans! 
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5. Tito and the Maclean Mission 
IT IS PERHAPS TIME that we asked ourselves this question, how it 
could come about that in 1945, the Yugoslav State organs should be 
helping American intelligence agents to penetrate behind the Soviet 
lines. We shall see in a moment that co-operation between the 
Yugoslav, U.S., and British intelligence services at this time was far 
closer than anyone imagined, and that it certainly had nothing to 
do, during 1945, with the defeat of the Germans. To find a satis-
factory reply to this puzzling question we have to return for a 
moment to the camps at Gurs and Vernet. . 
As we know, Laszlo Rajk had been in touch with Yugoslav 
Trotskyist groups at Vernet, and he knew that the Yugoslav Trot-
skyist leaders were in contact with the French Deuxieme Bureau in 
exactly the same way as he was himself. There were at least 150 
organised Yugoslay Trotskyists at Vernet in 1939, and this cannot 
be regarded as surprising in the light of the Yugoslav Communist 
Party's history. At this point it will be useful to mention some of the 
leaders' names, for we are to meet them again later in very different 
circumstances. Chief among them were Ivan Goshnjak, Kosta-Nadj, 
Milich, and Stefanovich. 
These people knew Rajk in the camp and worked with him. And 
like him, they too were contacted by the German major who visited 
Vernet in the spring of 1941 after France had fallen. At his trial 
later, Rajk was to say that the major had particularly asked him 
about Kosta-Nadj, Goshnjak, and several others. Like Rajk, 
they asked to be repatriated, and the Germans agreed. It may per-
haps be remarked that the Gestapo was not in the habit of repatriat-
ing its political opponents, even for war work. All known Com-
munists were always sent to concentration camps. This fact is 
important, because these Hungarians and Yugoslavs at Vernet were 
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claiming among their own comrades to be Communists. It appears 
that the Gestapo at any rate knew better. 
There were many Yugoslavs in the groups of which Rajk was a 
member and which travelled from Vernet to Germany during 1941. 
And in the course of a temporary stay in Leipzig before being sent 
on to Budapest, Rajk was able to observe that quite large groups of 
Yugoslavs were travelling on to Belgrade from there by permission 
of the Gestapo. It is thus clear that a numb~r of men who later 
were to hold positions of power in the partisan movement were al-
ready Trotskyites in Spain and were regarded by the Gestapo as 
valuable agents, in much the same way as Rajk was considered a 
useful provocateur for disruptive work inside the Hungarian Com-
munist Party. Needless to say, these facts were unknown at the time 
to the Yugoslav Communist Party. 
If we add to these indoctrinated Trotskyists those out and out 
nationalists who found their way into the partisan movement, and 
those honest men and women who, under the difficult conditions of 
years of illegality in the Yugoslav Communist Party, had not deep-
ened and consolidated their Marxist training, we begin to have be-
fore us some of the elements which will help to explain what was 
to occur later. There were, of course, many tried and experienced 
Marxists in the Yugoslav leadership, but in a moment we will see 
what happened to them. 
It is not possible to say exactly what political situation existed in 
the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party and the 
Partisan High Command by early 1943. At that time it had become 
clear that the partisans led by Tito were the only serious force fight-
ing the Germans, and that Mikhailovich and other right-wing bands 
were openly co-operating with the invaders. 
On December 14, 1943, Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, 
made the following declaration in the House of Commons: "As a 
result of the information we had, we decided as long ago as the 
spring of this year that we should ask General Tito to receive a 
British military mission. He said 'yes,' and British officers have been 
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with him ever since. Our nusslOn is under the leadership of a 
member of this House, Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean, who has estab-
lished most excellent relations with General Tito." To the world it 
appeared that Tito's fight against the Germans was so valuable to 
the allied cause that Mr. Churchill had been obliged to overcome 
his well-known antipathy for Communists and lend Tito British 
support. 
But things were not quite as simple as they appeared, and in their 
enthusiasm for the fight against the Nazis people overlooked the fact 
that a man of Churchill's record and political experience would not 
have been moved by sentimental, or even purely military considera-
tions. After all, if Tito the Communist deserved British help, how 
was it that the Communist Resistance movements in other countries 
were not favoured in similar fashion? 
There was no doubt that the French Communists were the core of 
the Resistance, yet their urgent appeals for arms were ignored to the 
very end. In Greece, E.L.A.S. was putting up a fight as courageous 
and as useful as that of Tito; but instead of help they eventually 
found British troops shooting them down in the streets of Athens. 
Was there something different about Tito's communism that made 
it acceptable to Mr. Churchill and MIS? 
The thing is rendered even more curious by Churchill's known 
war strategy. All the American war personalities, including Elliott 
Roosevelt, General Eisenhower, and Harry Hopkins, have stressed 
repeatedly in their memoirs that Churchill's main concern had al-
ways been to keep the Balkans from falling under Soviet influence. 
He pursued this line even to the point of trying to direct Anglo-
American military intervention on the European mainland into a 
Balkan expedition instead of opening the second front in the West 
as the Russians were insistently demanding from 1942 to 1944. 
Elliott Roosevelt reports his father, the President, as saying to him at 
Teheran that Churchill was thinking too much about the post-war 
situation, and that was why he was constantly proposing a Balkan 
invasion. 
Churchill did not get his invasion, of course, but he did send his 
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mission to Tito. And it was the purpose of this mission to win a 
bloodless victory for Churchill in the Balkans. The men who went 
to Tito were mostly experienced intelligence officers. They knew 
that some of the partisan leaders could be won over, partly by 
obtaining incriminating material against them and enrolling them 
as agents by means of blackmailing threats, partly by personal influ-
ence and persuasion, partly by political intrigue at Tito's head-
quarters. It is not unreasonable to suppose that MIS and the 
American G2 knew pretty well as much about the Trotskyists who 
had returned from Spain as the Gestapo had known. Also, the 
British pre-war espionage service in Yugoslavia had been far from 
mediocre; and a Communist Party which not so long before had 
found that even its general secretary was a police spy was quite likely 
to contain within its ranks British and American agents. We can 
thus see that if Churchill was prepared to do with Tito what he 
was unwilling to do with the Greek E.L.A.S. and the French F.T.P., 
he was probably basing his decision on pretty reliable information. 
The British mission at Tito's general headquarters was headed by 
Brigadier Maclean and Colonel Hamilton of the U.S. Army, and 
was also joined by Major Randolph Churchill, the Premier's son. 
Satellite missions were despatched to the fronts in Macedonia, 
Serbia, Vojvodina, Croatia, Slovenia, and the Island of Vis. 
There is no means of telling when and how the men at the very 
apex of the ruling clique-Rankovich, Kardelj, Djilas, and Tito him-
self-abandoned, if they had ever upheld, the principles of Marxism. 
But there are a number of significant pointers. 
When German parachutists surrounded the partisan headquarters 
at Drvar during 1944, for instance, the Yugoslav leaders were re-
moved by plane to the safety of Bari. It was because they saw an 
opportunity of getting Tito even more closely under their control 
that Maclean and Randolph Churchill proposed that a British war-
ship should take him and his staff to Vis for the duration of hostil-
ities. Rankovich, Djilas, and Kardelj strongly supported the 
proposal and Tito eventually agreed. 
Then, there was a moment when Churchill still had hopes of 
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operating his original plan to occupy the Adriatic coast. Here again, 
Rankovich, Kardelj, and Djilas agreed. A dispute arose in the 
partisan general staff, with the genuine Communists opposing the 
move for reasons which must be obvious. Tito wavered, and eventu-
ally opposed the scheme. 
Finally, there was the question of the liberation of Serbia and the 
capital, Belgrade. The Red Army was approaching rapidly and was 
already in Bulgaria and Rumania. The liberation of Serbia was an 
urgent military necessity. Maclean and Hamilton did their best 
through Rankovich, Djilas, and Kardelj to persuade Tito to refuse 
Soviet help. But when he realised he could not do the job with his 
own forces, Tito applied to the Russians, and Red Army troops 
threw the Germans out of the Yugoslav capital. 
These facts were mentioned later at the trial of Rajk by Lazar 
Brankov, whom we shall be meeting shortly. Brankov declared that 
he had heard them from Colonel Obrad Cicmil, a trusted member 
of Tito's staff. It is not of course possible to vouch for the precise 
accuracy of every detail in Brankov's revelations; indeed, on the 
question of Vis his evidence was inaccurate. And it is precisely the 
fallibility of a man relying on his memory to recall events long since 
past that lends authenticity to the general body of the evidence 
given at the trial. But there is enough circumstantial evidence and 
enough proof that other of Brankov's statements were true to 
demand that we take them seriously into account. 
Little can be said about the origins and the true political position 
of Alexander Rankovich and his immediate associates. Rankovich 
himself in 1944 was thirty-five years of age, and had been active in 
the Yugoslav working-class movement since the age of twenty. His 
record in the partisan war is shrouded in mystery. There was a good 
deal of talk in the movement, for instance, of an occasion when he 
and a small group had been captured by the Germans. All other 
members of the group were shot, but Rankovich succeeded in get-
ting free a few weeks later. In view of what we shall shortly record 
about him, it is perfectly permissible to suggest, as Brankov sug-
gested later, that Rankovich may have been recruited as a German 
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agent at this time. Certainly, Rajk was recruited by the police in 
similar and far less compelling circumstances. 
There was also some general talk among the partisans to the effect 
that between 1941 and 1943 Tito had carried on negotiations with 
the Germans, and had broken these off only when the great Red 
Army victories of 1943 convinced him that the Germans could not 
win the war. 
Upon Tito himself it is pointless to speculate. Whether he was an 
organised agent, or a nationalist masquerading as a Marxist, or 
simply a vain man who loved power more than his principles and 
found himself a virtual prisoner of his associates, the fact remains 
that we shall have occasion to observe his rapid political and moral 
degeneration. Whatever his own position-and there is some evi-
dence to show that his main characteristics were a frantic desire to 
cling to power and a vacillating and weak temperament-he was 
surrounded from the beginning by some men whom we can safely 
regard as spies. Later, the Trotskyists and nationalists in the en-
tourage gained a dominant position both in the party and the army 
and the development of socialism in Yugoslavia was doomed from 
that moment. 
During 1943 and 1944, however, the genuine Marxists were put-
ting up a stiff fight against what then appeared to be the political 
deviations of the Tito group. Chief among these critics were colonel-
generals Jovanovich and Zujovich, and Andrija, and Hebrang, the 
latter two members of the Central Committee. Jovanovich and 
Zujovich were on the General Staff. We shall see later how the 
dominating Tito group got rid of them. 
Apart from these three, of course, there were scores of honest and 
able Marxists among the cadres of the partisan army and tens of 
thousands of sincere Communists in the movement as a whole. 
From the beginning, the Trotskyists who had reached positions of 
power started on a devilish plan to eliminate the best of the Com-
munist leaders. They arranged to send them to those sectors of the 
battle where death was almost certain. And discipline was such that 
they knew their victims could never refuse. In this way, the men 
43 
who could have saved the Yugoslav Communist Party and the 
Yugoslav State from the disasters which were to beset them later 
were largely wiped out before 1945. 
It is revealing, in the light of what we now know, to reread some 
of the literary works produced by the members of the British liaison 
group. Mr. Basil Davidson, who was in the Vojvodina, speaks in his 
Partisan Picture of the time it took to persuade the Foreign Office 
that Tito should be supported. It appears that MIS knew more in 
1942 and 1943 than it was prepared to tell the politicians in the 
Cabinet. One can visualise the intelligence service trying to make 
the politicians understand that there was more to Tito than at first 
met the eye, but unwilling to tell them exactly how much more. 
Mr. Davidson also stresses in his book the "spirit of independence" 
of the South Slavs. He reports Tito as answering a question as to 
which great power Yugoslavia would find herself closest to after 
the war with a generalisation about "independence." 
Brigadier Maclean himself, in his Eastern Approaches, gives an 
account of the flight from Drvar in 1944. Eastern Approaches, which 
was published in 1949, had the evident political purpose of counter-
ing the charge that Tito and his group had ever been anything but 
orthodox Communists protesting against the allegedly intolerable 
dictation of Moscow. Its history, and in particular its opinions, must 
therefore be treated with some reserve. 
According to Maclean, Tito and his staff went to the Island of Vis 
in a British warship and for a while their headquarters were set up 
there. One day, however, they disappeared. Here is Maclean's 
account of the incident (p. 498): 
"There could be no doubt about it. Tito had gone. As an indig-
nant telegram from Mr. Churchill put it, he had 'levanted.' One 
morning Vivian Street, who in my absence was in charge of Vis, 
had gone to visit him with a message from General Wilson, only to 
find he had disappeared from the island without leaving a trace. 
Inquiries as to his whereabouts only elicited evasive replies. It was 
the old story, so familiar from Moscow days: he is sick, he is busy, 
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he has gone for a walk. The more responsible members of the 
Marshal's entourage seemed to have gone too; the others, if they 
knew anything, were too nervous to reveal it. On further investiga-
tion, it was discovered that an unidentified Russian aircraft had 
landed on Vis and taken off again, presumably with Tito on board." 
Whatever the accuracy or otherwise of the details as given by 
Brigadier Maclean, he is in fact claiming that Tito accepted the 
British proposal and went to Vis. It is certain that once there, he 
and his group were no longer free agents in their management of 
the partisan war. It is certain too that the Soviet Government had 
different ideas. And if the story of the sudden Hight is true it bears 
witness to that fact. 
Maclean seems unaware that there is any political significance in 
the fact that Tito and his friends, who must have known of Mr. 
Churchill's plans in the Balkans, were prepared to place themselves 
in his hands iIi this fashion, especially when the Red Army was all 
along offering an alternative. More, Churchill's anger is both under-
standable and highly significant. 
As for the sudden departure, it could easily be accounted for by 
the all-important need, from Tito's viewpoint, of appearing to be 
an uncompromising political opponent of Mr. Churchill and his 
Balkan plans. 
Eastern Approaches is couched in the text-book phraseology of the 
professional anti-Sovieteer, but among the stock slanders and silly 
distortions, some interesting and significant remarks can be found. 
At one point Maclean says of Tito (p. 340): "Already I had been 
I struck by his independence of mind. And independence of any kind 
was, I knew, incompatible with orthodox Communism." 
Justifying the despatch of his mission, Maclean declares (p. 340) : 
"If, as seemed probable, the partisans were going to be the future 
masters of Yugoslavia, the sooner we established satisfactory rela-
tions with them, the better." Why did no one ever say this about 
E.L.A.S. in Greece, or about the Communist-led Resistance move-
ments throughout Eastern Europe ? 
Finally, on the question of Tito's intense chauvinism, here is Mac-
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lean's distorted but revealing view (p. 325): "He reacted equally 
strongly to anything that, by the widest stretch of the imagination, 
might be regarded as a slight on the national dignity of Yugoslavia. 
This national pride, it struck me, was an unexpected characteristic 
in one whose first loyalty, as a Communist, must needs be to a 
foreign power, the Soviet Union." 
Of course, Communists do not place friendship for the Soviet 
Union above their own patriotism, since the two are inextricably 
entwined. But that Tito, a Communist, should give a man of Mac-
lean's type this impression is remarkable indeed. 
During the period that the British mission was with Tito, it was 
agreed that the Yugoslavs should appoint official representatives in 
a number of Western countries. The man sent to Marseilles was a 
certain Latinovich, whom we have already met. Misha Lompar, 
who was sent to Switzerland, is also known to us. And we shall 
soon see that General Velebit, who was sent to London, was an 
organised British intelligence agent. Thus the journey of the Szonyi 
spy group from Switzerland to Hungary, at first sight so incredible, 
now becomes simple enough to understand. 
It is not possible to give with any certainty a complete list of the 
men who, during the war years, can be regarded as mainly responsi-
ble for the destruction of the Yugoslav Communist Party. Brankov 
later gave a list of names which is certainly incomplete. He declared 
that he knew it from his perusal of the secret files of the U.D.B., 
the Yugoslav foreign intelligence service; certainly, as a high U.D.B. 
officer, those files would be accessible to him. 
Brankov listed, in addition to Rankovich, Kardelj, Diljas and 
those whom we have already mentioned, the names of Marko 
Belinich, who later became a member of the Croatian Cabinet; 
Karlo Mrazovich, who will figure largely in this story as Yugoslav 
Minister in Budapest and was later appointed Ambassador in Mos-
cow; Petar Stambolich, later Prime Minister of Serbia; A vdo Humo, 
secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
Bosnia; Lieutenant General Mihailov Apostolsic, of the General 
Staff in Macedonia; Svetozar Vukmanovich, later a member of the 
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Yugoslav Government; General Orovich, of the Vojvodina General 
Staff; Jovan Veselinov, secretary of the Vojvodina party Central 
Committee; Jojkich, another member of that Committee who was 
later sent as a V.D.B. agent to Hungary; Miha Marinko, later to be 
premier of Slovenia; Boris Kidrich, later a member of the central 
government. 
To these must be added the names of Ales Bebler, now Deputy 
Foreign Minister; Bozhidar Maslarich, Minister of Transport; 
Cicmil, whom we shall meet again in Budapest and who became 
Yugoslav Minister in London during 1949; and Ivan Goshnjak, a 
member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party, and Tito's 
deputy. 
These at any rate were some of the men whom Churchill rightly 
regarded as worthy of his support. It must be recognised that the 
Maclean mission did its work well, though not as well as Mr. 
Churchill had hoped. For they were aiming far beyond the borders 
of Yugoslavia itself, and were planning an Eastern European policy 
of extremely ambitious proportions. We shall have occasion to 
examine it in the course of this narrative. 
Nevertheless, the work inside Yugoslavia since 1943 had not been 
unfruitful. And when Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean finally left Bel-
grade on March 13, 1945, one day after the arrival of the first post-
war British ambassador, he was probably well enough pleased with 
himself. Five months later he took his seat in the new Parliament 
as Tory M.P. for Lancaster. 
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6. The V.D.B. In Hungary 
IN NINETEEN-FORTY-FlVE, when the Allied Control Commission was 
already at work in defeated Hungary, Marshal Tito asked for per-
mission to send a Yugoslav military mission to Budapest. This 
request was granted, and a Yugoslav group under the leadership of 
Colonel Cicmil arrived in the Hungarian capital. The mission had 
been got together under the direct supervision of Minister of Home 
Affairs Rankovich and Minister of State Djilas, and Colonel Cicmil 
had also received a final briefing from the Marshal in person. 
This briefing consisted of three instruc.tions which, had they been 
generally known, would have caused incredulous astonishment from 
one end of Europe to the other. Firstly, the Yugoslavs were told 
that conditions were not stable in Hungary and they therefore had 
to organise a good intelligence service there. Secondly, they were to 
establish contact with the British and U.S. officers working in Buda-
pest. And thirdly, they were to take good care not to come under 
the influence of the Soviet representatives on the Allied Control 
Commission. The exact nature of these secret instructions is known 
because Cicmil discussed them with his associates, some of whom 
were later to reveal them to the world at large. 
At this stage it will be useful to meet the leading figures in the 
Yugoslav Mission. They will all be met with again later. First there 
was Cicmil, whose secret job was to establish contact with the British 
and Americans. Almost at once, according to evidence given later 
by Brankov, he got into touch with General Edgecumbe, British 
representative on the Allied Control Commission, and started to 
exchange espionage information on a regular basis.· Cicmil's reports 
were taken to the British General by a Lieutenant Popovich. Con-
• General Edgecumbe wrote a letter to the London Times on October 26, 
1949, in which he described Brankov's evidence as "pure fabrication." 
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tact was also established with Mr. Pettitt, the British Vice~Consul, 
Mr. Milton, American commercial attache, and Captain Marty, 
Allied Military Permit Officer-again according to Brankov. 
Placing them in the order of their importance as intelligence 
agents, the following Yugoslavs made up Colonel Cicmil's mission: 
Major Javorsky, chief representative in Hungary of the U.D.B.; 
Major Kovach (no connection with the American Lieutenant-
Colonel Kovach); Lazar Brankov, who was later to become chief 
of the Military Mission, chief of the U.D.B. in Hungary, and eventu~ 
ally Charge d'Affaires; Major Smiljanich, and a number of indi-
viduals of lesser importance. 
Javorsky was to organise the espionage network in Hungary; 
Kovach had the main task of collecting information on the Red 
Army, and Brankov was responsible during the early days for 
reparations affairs and economic espionage. 
This man Brankov, who four years later was to have his moment 
on the world stage before being swept away by forces far stronger 
than he and his friends, is worth a moment of study. As in the case 
of so many other Yugoslavs whose political development had not 
kept pace with their knowledge of fighting and conspiracy, four 
years in the partisan movement had bred in him a fanatical adora-
tion for Tito. Further, his own deeds and those of the Yugoslav 
partisans in general had filled this already proud man with a con-
suming personal and national conceit. Whether he had been a 
nationalist and chauvinist before the war is not known. But the 
training of Yugoslavia's clique of nationalist and chauvinist leaders 
had made him one now. 
His contempt for the Hungarians he paraded on every conceivable 
occasion. And in those days it was only too easy to mistake the 
haughty arrogance of a man like Brankov for the psychological scars 
of four years of unbelievable hardship in the mountains. At that 
time the world believed that every Yugoslav had endured privations 
and hardships never before encountered in the history of war. It 
was true of many, but it was not true of most of the leaders who 
survived. 
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Brankov used to drive hell-for-leather through the streets of Buda-
pest in a great, blue, open German sports car, every inch the con-
queror. His manner was hard and unyielding, his appearance im-
maculate. He was a small-scale edition of his master, the luxury-
loving Marshal. 
The Yugoslav Mission not only had the tasks entrusted to them in 
Belgrade. Soon a new and far more important role was to be filled, 
for in the second half of 1946 the main operations of V.S. and 
British intelligence in Hungary were handed over to the Yugoslavs. 
Rajk, as chief American agent in Hungary, was given instructions 
in the autumn of that year to sever his American connections and 
maintain contact only with the Yugoslavs from then on. But until 
that happened, the Yugoslav spy network can be regarded as a 
parallel organisation to that of the Americans, independently organ-
ised though clearly working in close harmony. 
By 1945 the main strategy of the Tito group had been clearly 
formulated, though kept a strict secret from all but the higher ranks 
of the V.D.B. The aim was to undermine the Communist Parties 
in the Peoples' Democracies, while building up the personal popu-
larity of Marshal Tito and his Yugoslavia. By political means, or if 
necessary by military means, these countries were to be detached 
from their close relations with the Soviet Union and welded into a 
Balkan federation under direct Yugoslav leadership. For the pur-
poses of propaganda, this would be presented as a brilliant new 
development of Marxism in the realm of relations between Socialist 
States. Needless to say, a policy requiring for its operation the 
services of fascist police spies and the active co-operation of the 
British and V.S. intelligence services would be a novel form of 
Marxism indeed. 
This policy was both Yugoslav, American, and British at the same 
time. To the clique in control in Belgrade it offered power beyond 
their own borders and the possibility of maintaining themselves as 
rulers of a State which would become the centre of a new type of 
Balkan imperialism. At the same time, for Tito and his friends, an 
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alliance of this kind under general American direction represented 
a powerful blow against the Soviet Union and against the genuine 
revolutionary movement inside Yugoslavia. The whole political life 
of many of these men had been devoted to objectives of this kind. 
For the British and Americans, the advantages of the plan were 
obvious. They had always suspected, and they were soon to know 
for certain, that the old Right-wing and the Social Democrats in 
Eastern Europe were spent political forces. The hope of simply 
turning the clock back and restoring capitalism without more ado 
receded steadily through 1945 and 1946, as in election after election 
the Right was defeated. This hopeful theory received its death blow 
in February 1948, in Czechoslovakia, when the Right was decisively 
beaten there. 
Always, from the moment when the British intelligence service 
had persuaded the Foreign Office in 1943 to back the Maclean mis-
sion in Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav Trotskyists had been regarded as 
the main hope of the imperial powers in Eastern Europe. Thus, a 
policy which sought to organise a Balkan federation under Tito's 
leadership, may have been the policy of the Yugoslav Government; 
but it was very much more the policy of the British and Americans. 
And that is why, from the very beginning, the Yugoslav and Anglo-
American espionage organisations worked so closely together, and 
only fused completely later in Hungary when contact between the 
spies and the Anglo-U.S. diplomatic representatives became too 
dangerous. 
To operate such a policy in the neighboring countries, a number 
of parallel lines had to be pursued at once. The Communist Parties 
-the only serious force standing between the Anglo-Americans and 
their objectives-had to be split, confused, rendered impotent. To 
do this, pro-Tito, nationalist groups must be organised within the 
Communist ranks. Secondly plans must be laid for eventual military 
coups, to be carried out should political methods fail. These coups 
would involve the assassination of the Communist leaders. Thirdly, 
the Right, including the reactionary parties, the old clergy, the 
Trotskyists, the Right-wing Social Democrats, and even the emigres 
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in the West, must be encouraged in every possible way, as part of 
the process of creating difficulties for the struggling young Peoples' 
Democracies. And finally, general espionage must be pushed ahead, 
directed both against the countries in question and against the Soviet 
Union itself. 
We shall have occasion to observe how each of these comple-
mentary lines of action was pursued by the British, American, and 
Yugoslav spy rings in Budapest. And we will need to remember 
that the plan in Hungary was by no means unique: similar plans 
and similar activities were in hand in everyone of the Popular 
Democracies-Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Poland, Rumania, and Al-
bania-and in the democratic movement in Greece. 
The Yugoslav mission started at once to carry out Tito's directive 
to build up an efficient information service. Among those they 
recruited in their first year of work Laszlo Rajk naturally has pride 
of place. But there were other useful figures as well. 
Endre Szebenyi, the sharp and able Under-Secretary of State at 
the Ministry of the Interior, was brought in. So was Sandor Cseres-
nyes, whom we last encountered as a Trotskyist in Vernet camp in 
France. Between whiles Cseresnyes had spent some years in the 
Psychological Warfare Department of the British Army, where he 
had been recruited as a British agent. He worked with the British 
until 1946, but already in 1944 in Bari, Italy, he had been in touch 
with the Yugoslav secret service and had become a Yugoslav agent 
as well. He was Press Chief at the Ministry of the Interior when he 
was picked up again by the Yugoslavs. And he had been put into 
the job by Rajk, who became Minister of Interior on March 21, 1946. 
Cseresnyes had the task of popularising the person of his chief, and 
his press department did nothing but this. 
Also recruited by the Yugoslavs were Ferenc Gondi, deputy chief 
of the Protocol Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 
Joseph Rex, another high-ranking Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
official, who had earlier deserted from the Yugoslav partisans and 
was being threatened by Brankov with exposure. 
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These names are only typical. There were many more of equal 
importance. All told, they added up to a respectable spy ring which 
constituted a real menace to the security of the Hungarian State. 
To them must be added, of course, the name of Colonel, soon to be 
Major-General, George PalfIy, who was on good terms with the 
members of the Yugoslav Military Mission in no time. Shrewd 
judges of men, Cicmil, Javorsky, and Brankov soon understood 
what manner of democrat Palffy really was. By 1946 the thing was 
put squarely to him and he enlisted formally as a Yugoslav agent. 
At this point too must be added the name of Paul Justus. Justus 
had been a leading member of the Right-wing of the Social Demo-
crats. Later, following the visit to Budapest of Dennis Healey on 
behalf of the Foreign Department of the British Labour Party, Mr. 
Justus was observed to switch sides with startling rapidity. It had 
become clear that the political future lay with the Left. Eventually, 
after the fusion of the Communists and Social Democrats, Justus 
was to become Vice-President of the Hungarian Radio~ But at the 
moment we are speaking of, in 1945 and 1946, he was an influential 
member of the Social Democratic Party Executive Committee. 
What was not generally known about Justus at that time was that 
for 20 years he had been a Trotskyist, and that in 1936 in Paris, and 
later after his return to Hungary, he had spied for the same police 
department for which Laszlo Rajk had worked for so many years. 
Justus met Colonel Cicmil at a reception at the end of 1945, and 
by early 1946 Major Javorsky had confronted him with a photostatic 
copy of a report on him from the pre-war Hungarian Legation in 
Paris to the police in Budapest. It was clear from this report that 
Justus was an agent, and Javorsky told him unkindly that the report 
would be published unless he was prepared to become a spy once 
again. Clearly, the industrious Dr. Sombor-Schweinitzer had been 
at work again, passing the secret files of the Horthy political police 
to the Americans, who were passing them in turn to their chief 
agents in Eastern Europe, the Yugoslavs. 
It need hardly be stressed that Paul Justus' training as a Trotskyist 
and a Social Democrat of the Right did not prepare him to resist 
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blackmail of this description. He tried to pretend to the Yugoslavs 
that he would work for them, not because he was afraid, but because 
he agreed with their ideas. But like Allan Dulles when recruiting 
Tibor Szonyi in Switzerland, Major Javorsky preferred a good 
blackmailing document to all the ideological protestations in the 
world. And after 'all, Paul Justus had adopted such a wide variety 
of ideological positions in his time. There was no telling when he 
might turn his coat again. For such individuals there was nothing 
like a good photostat. 
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7. The Meeting at Abbazia 
IN MAY OF 1947, Lazar Brankov, who now headed the U.D.B. in 
Hungary, paid a visit to Minister of the Interior Rankovich in Bel-
grade. There he was told about the Yugoslav plan for a Balkan 
federation. It was the first time he had been given open and exact 
information on Tito's strategy. Rankovich said that in order to 
operate Tito's plan the policy of the Hungarian Government would 
have to be changed, and he mentioned the names of Matyas Rakosi, 
leader of the Hungarian Communist Party, Gero, head of the Eco-
nomic Council, and Farkas, Minister of Defence, as the chief 
obstacles to a change of line in Budapest. Rajk, he said, was the 
man to popularise, and the prestige of Rakosi, Gero, and Farkas had 
to be decreased by every means open to the many agents who were 
now operating in Hungary. 
Soon after Brankov had visited Rankovich in Belgrade, Rajk also 
went to Yugoslavia, to Abbazia, for his summer holidays. From the 
frontier onwards he got a reception which he was to describe later 
as "demonstratively extravagant." Everywhere stations and streets 
were decorated for him, and under the leadership of the Yugoslav 
Communist Party the local populations came out in their thousands 
to greet him. 
Scarcely had he arrived in the luxurious villa placed at his disposal 
in Abbazia by the Yugoslav Government than he received a visit 
from a leading member of the V.D.E. in Croatia, a blonde woman 
of about thirty. Speaking Hungarian, she informed him that Ranko-
vich wanted to see him and would shortly arrive in Abbazia. She 
would act as interpreter and the meeting must be regarded as abso-
lutely secret. 
That first meeting between Hungarian Minister of the Interior 
Rajk and Yugoslav Minister of the Interior Rankovich must be 
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regarded as a classic in the annals of international political intrigue. 
Rankovich was direct to the point of brutality. He knew, he said, 
that Rajk had worked for the Horthy political police, and he was 
there to tell him that unless he supported Tito in the future, his 
record would be exposed. This, declared Rankovich, was stated 
directly on the Marshal's behalf. 
Rajk protested that he had never been a police spy. If he was sup-
porting Tito's policy in Hungary it was because he agreed with it. 
But Rankovich was not prepared to do Rajk even the small kindness' 
of permitting him to pretend to a genuine political viewpoint. Let 
us quote what happened next from Rajk's evidence at his trial two 
years later: 
"Upon this, Rankovich, somewhat mockingly, pulled from his 
pocket a photostat copy which he gave me to read. I discovered that 
it was the declaration I had given to Hetenyi, of Horthy's political 
police, when I was arrested in 1931. I asked Rankovich how he 
came to possess a photostat copy of such a document. . . . Rankovich 
replied that it did not turn up from the files of the Yugoslav fascist 
police but was given to them by the Americans. The files of the 
Horthy police were evacuated to the West . . . and these files fell 
into the hands of the Americans." 
Raj k tried to protest that common blackmail was unnecessary, 
since he agreed politically with Tito's ideas anyhow. But Rankovich 
was quite unwilling to be an idealist, or to believe that Rajk was 
capable of any greater sincerity towards Tito than he had demon-
strated towards the Communist Party. Speaking as one Minister of 
the Interior to another, he said, it was better for "technical reasons' 
if the photostat copy of the 1931 document were carefully borne i. 
mind. 
Rankovich then told Rajk that the Yugoslav authorities had full 
information about his conversations with U.S. representatives in 
Belgrade since 1945. His main task now would be to build up a 
strong anti-Rakosi fraction in the Hungarian Communist Party, 
under his personal leadership. And Laszlo Rajk was sent back to 
Budapest by his new master, the Minister of the Interior in a Yugo-
56 
slav Government which the people ohhe world still believed to be 
a government of principled and steadfast Communists. 
By the time Rajk met Rankovich in Abbazia, he had already 
proved his worth as aspy. He had provided Brankov and the other 
Yugoslav agents · in Budapest with preliminary details of the 
Hungarian budget, and with secret information on the investigations. 
which led to the exposure of the Ferenc Nagy plot in June 1947~ 
This information was in the hands of the Yugoslavs at the beginning 
of the year, and was sent to the American Legation by Colonel 
Cicmil. Rajk also provided the operation and service regulations of 
the Hungarian police force, and a copy of the secret Hungarian 
administrative map. And the Yugoslavs were given one of Hun-
gary's most closely-guarded secrets-the measures being taken by the 
Ministry of the Interior to deal with British and u.s. intelligence 
agents on Hungarian territory. 
In the realm of sedition and conspiracy, Rajk had been equally 
active. He made possible the escape from Hungary of the Right-
wing plotters, Bela Varga, Karoly Peyer, Szelig, Sulyok, and Pfeiffer, 
who were later to set up their counter-revolutionary headquarters. 
under u.s. State Department supervision in Washington. In the 
case of the Nagy conspiracy, he suppressed a number of documents 
incriminating various individuals. 
Early in 1947, at the direct request of Brankov, he ordered the 
forcible transportation from the Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier area 
of seventy Hungarian families designated by the Yugoslav U.D.B. 
as unfriendly to Tito. This move, which was concealed from the 
government, was the first of a series designed to foster pro-Tito-
sentiments along the frontier. It was the preparation for frontier 
incidents which were to be organised later. 
Also during 1946 and 1947, Rajk freed from detention a number 
of war criminals and agents. Among these was one Imre Gayer, the 
man whom he had introduced into the Communist Party in 1941 
after his return from Spain, and who, according to Rajk, had 
caused the death of Rozsa and Schonherz. The paper authorising 
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Gayer's release was dated December 17, 1946, and it bore the 
signature of Laszlo Rajk. 
During this period General George PalfIy was also at work. In 
the spring of 1946 he added the post of Commander-in-Chief of the 
Frontier Guard to that of the head of the Political Department of 
the Army. Palffy was now in a position to be of greatly added use 
to his masters. By early 1947 he was on terms of complete frankness 
with Rajk, and they were already starting to work together. At that 
time, while the new Hungarian Army was being built up, PalfIy 
concentrated on keeping workers out of the officers' schools. 
Although the government's policy was to produce new cadres of 
working-class and peasant officers, Palffy managed his role so well 
that during his three years in the Political Department, not a single 
worker was commissioned. The Army was being built up as a suit-
able instrument for the counter-revolution. 
Meanwhile, Palffy was giving the Yugoslav Legation everything 
they asked for: the disposition of Hungarian troops, the secret maps 
of the Hungarian High Command, the disposition of the Frontier 
Guard, and information about Red Army forces which were in the 
country under the terms of the peace treaty. 
Tibor Szonyi, the man from Switzerland, was also active. During 
1946 he had received by special courier a message from Switzerland 
which read: "Peter should get in touch with Wagner's acquaintance 
from France." It is necessary to explain here that before leaving 
Berne he had arranged with Allan Dulles, the chief of the American 
O.S.S., that for matters of special importance the Belgrade-Mar-
seilles-Berne channel of communication should be by-passed, and 
direct contact set up by courier. His code name would be Peter, 
and Dulles would call himself Wagner. More, Dulles had spoken 
to Szonyi of Rajk and mentioned that he had known about him in 
France. 
A few days after receiving the message, Szonyi asked Rajk to meet 
him in his office in the Organisation Department of the party head-
quarters in Akademia Street. There, really frank contact was estab-
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lished between them for the first time, and when Szonyi got the 
highly important post of chief of the party's Cadres Department in 
November of 1947, that relationship developed into one of the most 
dangerous of all for the Hungarian State. 
Andras Szalai had been officially enrolled as a Yugoslav agent at 
the premises of the Yugoslav Military Mission at 14 Javor Street in 
the spring of 1946. There he had been confronted with the in-
formation that the Yugoslav authorities knew about his responsibil-
ity for the massacre at Satoraljaujhely prison in 1944 and had every 
intention of denouncing him should he refuse to sign on the dotted 
line. Becoming a spy presented neither moral nor political problems 
to Szalai, who had been a spy all his life. He signed. 
He handed secret information of various kinds to Major Smil-
janich of the Military Mission until, later in 1947, he joined the 
Communist Party's Cadres Department. From there he was able to 
influence the choice of parliamentary candidates and the placing of 
officials in many spheres of work. He found himself in the thick of 
the developing plot against the State. 
It can be seen that by mid-1947 the various independent spy rings, 
some organised by the Americans, some by the Yugoslavs, were 
being drawn together and centralised in a powerful and dangerous 
organisation. Most of them had passed from espionage to the first 
stages in the organisation of a treasonable plot. 
The Army was being prepared by PalfIy; the police and internal 
security organs by Rajk from his post of vantage as head of the 
Ministry of the Interior. In every sphere of industrial and State life, 
spies and ex-fascists were being put into positions of power and 
workers were being excluded. At the same time, the person of Rajk 
was being propagandised by every conceivable means, and the first 
tentative efforts at bringing about political confusion within the 
ranks of the Communist Party were put under way. 
Rajk and the main plotters had become thoroughly conversant 
with the American plan to build a Balkan federation under Tito's 
leadership as a preliminary to a return of capitalism in the People's 
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Democracies. Lazar Brankov had been told of the plan by Ranko-
vich; so had Rajk at the meeting in Abbazia. And the conception 
of replacing the Soviet Union by Yugoslavia in the minds of the 
people as Hungary's protector and friend had now been explained 
to the lesser members of the ring. 
The stage was set for the great effort to popularise Tito which 
was to be made on the occasion of his visit to Budapest for the 
signing of the Hungarian-Yugoslav treaty of friendship at the end 
of 1947. But first we must turn for a moment to the remarkable 
story of a young Yugoslav woman named Ljubitsa Ribar. 
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8. The Story of Ljubitsa Ribar 
LJUBITSA RIBAR was a Yugoslav woman of 31 who had lived for 
several years in Hungary as a refugee. Among her Yugoslav friends 
in the Hungarian capital was a certain Rudolf Cacinovich. In 1945 
she met Major Javorsky when she visited the newly arrived Yugo-
slav military mission in order to register. Javorsky, unknown to 
Ljubitsa Ribar, was a leading member of the U.D.B., and, as we 
know, he had instructions from Minister of the Interior Ranko-
vich to recruit a wide network of spies in Hungary. 
At this first meeting Javorsky questioned Ljubitsa Ribar closely, 
and at a second meeting shortly afterwards the questions were con-
tinued and he suggested for the first time that it was her duty to 
help the Yugoslav Government in every possible way. He expressed 
interest in her wide circle of acq uain tances in the aristocracy and 
the Church. And his demands that she should work for the Yugo-
slav intelligence service were backed up by her friend Cacinovich. 
She refused. 
It was in the summer of 1947 that these agents of the Yugoslav 
D.D.B. first used threats against her. Here is how she described the 
incident afterwards in her evidence at the trial of Rajk and his 
accomplices: 
"Cacioovich called me up in the Szent Istvan Hospital, saying 
that he absolutely had to speak to me. When I met him at · the 
agreed time he showed me a Yugoslav newspaper in which they 
had written that my brother in Yugoslavia had been arrested as a 
member of a conspiracy against the Government. Cacinovich de-
clared that if I were not willing to be helpful and work for the 
D.D.B. my brother would be sentenced to death. He also declared 
that he knew very well how fond I was of my family and therefore 
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he had already reported my consent to Belgrade. I did not answer 
anything and he took my silence for consent." 
From that moment onwards the drama of Ljubitsa Ribar moved 
rapidly to its climax. Towards the end of the year she applied to 
the Yugoslav Consulate for a visa to travel to Austria in order to 
see her young daughter. One day in December Cacinovich told her 
the Legation authorities wanted to see her about the application. 
When she arrived at the offices she was received by the Consul, 
Smiljanich. Harshly, Smiljanich told her that they had no intention 
of granting her the visa to go to Austria, because she really wanted 
to escape. 
Then, in the Yugoslav Consulate in the very centre of Budapest, 
Ljubitsa Ribar was arrested and locked in a back room. 
What happened next is best described in her own words at the 
trial: 
"After this, two days later, in the evening, two employees of the 
Legation brought me down and forced me to get into a car. They 
warned me not to cause any disturbance. Another civilian unknown 
to me, and the chauffeur named Nikolai, got into the car and we 
started towards the frontier. At that time I was not aware of where 
we were going. 
"A little before the frontier we stopped. They said I had to get 
out and took me over to the other side. There, in Yugoslav terri-
tory, a completely closed truck was already waiting. They made me 
get in and I was guarded there by soldiers. In a short while they 
brought into the car three men whose hands and eyes were band-
aged and bound. Then the truck started again. In a few hours 
we arrived in the yard of a building. Before I could get out my 
eyes, too, were bound and they took me into a jail and there my 
eyes were unbound. 
"1 was kept there from about December 15 until January 5, 1948. 
Then Blazich, Javorsky and an unknown U.D.B. officer inquired of 
me about Mr. Pettitt, British Consul General in Budapest, and 
about my connections with the British Legation. Then they told 
me that I must do intelligence work in Hungary against the Hun-
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garian Government and at the same time they wanted me to act 
as liaison between the Yugoslav and British intelligence agents. 
When I did not want to give my consent, they threatened that I, 
too, would be liquidated. After this they made me sign a statement 
in which I bound myself to work for the Yugoslav U.D.B. 
"When I signed this, in about an hour they took me out of the 
jail and put me into a car. Then we stopped again at a street corner 
and Cacinovich got into the car, and then we went again to the 
frontier. At the frontier the driver called Nikolai stepped out with 
three passports, arranged the matter of the passports, and then they 
took me to Budapest almost to my house, where they set me free." 
The case of Ljubitsa Ribar is instructive because it illustrates 
several of the recruiting techniques of the Yugoslav and American 
intelligence services. To Ljubitsa Ribar were applied personal in-
timidation and the agonising moral pressure of the threats against 
her brother. Then, when she had been reduced in this way to 
signing an undertaking to spy, that undertaking itself was used to 
blackmail her into continuing her work., 
Like the Americans, the Yugoslav U.D.B. regarded a blackmailing 
hold as the most effective way of ensuring the loyalty of their agents. 
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9. The Second Meeting - Kelebia 
RAJK and the Yugoslav Legation did their best to make Marshal 
Tito's visit to Budapest in the autumn of 1947 the nearest thing to 
the triumphal progress of a conquering hero that could be devised 
in the circumstances. Apart from the beflagging of streets and the 
organisation of processions and festivities, the idea was to make 
the security arrangements so prodigious and so inconvenient that 
the extreme importance of the Marshal's person would be forcibly 
impressed upon the minds of the people of Budapest. 
Yugoslav Minister of the Interior Rankovich sent a delegation led 
by Milich, a high V.D.B. official, to see Rajk a few days before Tito's 
scheduled arrival. Milich instructed Rajk to see that heavy guards, 
fully armed, were placed at every point visited by the Marshal; that 
occupants of flats and houses along his route were forcibly evacuated, 
ostensibly to guard against the possibility of a bomb being thrown 
at him; that all the drains along the route of his procession were 
examined on the day before his arrival. Further, Tito must have 
one of the finest villas in Budapest as his headquarters. 
Rajk was not altogether successful in this arduous assignment, 
and the Hungarian Government eventually refused to permit him 
to indulge some of the wilder fancies of the V.D.B. In particular, 
he did not succeed in obtaining quite the most splendid villa of all. 
The reaction of the Yugoslav Legation was sharp. The recently 
appointed Minister, Mrazovich, informed the Hungarian Govern-
ment officially only thirty-six hours before Tito was due to arrive 
that if they failed to provide the accommodation and security 
measures regarded by the Marshal as proper to his station, the 
whole journey would be cancelled and the friendship pact, pre-
sumably, would remain for the moment unsigned. 
While this curious diplomatic farce was being performed by the 
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Yugoslavs, Rajk was mobilising the Federation of People's Colleges, 
the Hungarian-Yugoslav Society, and the Democratic Union of the 
South Slavs of Hungary to organise a kind of Tito festival in Buda-
pest. The first of these bodies was the special creation of Raj k and 
was led by his men and indoctrinated, as far as possible, with pro-
Tito ideas. The third had been captured by Yugoslav agents who 
were using it to spread dissatisfaction among the people of Yugoslav 
origin inhabiting the frontier areas of Hungary. 
The Yugoslav Government, of course, was far too anxious to show 
the splendid figure of the Marshal in Budapest to follow through 
the threat to call the visit off. And so Tito duly appeared in the 
Hungarian capital. And if the life of the city was not completely 
disrupted for the occasion, Rajk had nevertheless organised an im-
pressive show. 
After the Budapest proceedings, a hunting party for the Yugoslav 
'delegation was organised near Kelebia. Among the members of the 
delegation was Yugoslav Minister of the Interior Rankovich, and it 
was in a carriage of the special Yugoslav train at Kelebia that he 
and Laszlo Rajk held their second meeting, this time with Lazar 
Brankov, chief of the U.D.B. in Hungary, as interpreter. It was a 
meeting which must rank in importance with the first encounter 
during that summer at Abbazia. 
Rankovich stressed again the aim of building a Balkan federation 
under Tito's leadership. The countries taking part in this federation 
would halt the development of socialism and would adopt bourgeois 
(Western) democracy as their political system. Revelations at Rajk's 
trial were later to demonstrate that what Rankovich and Rajk 
really had in mind even then was a personal dictatorship in Hun-
gary on lines similar to those of the Tito dictatorship in Yugoslavia. 
Rankovich added that the proposed federation of States would com-
mand the support of the U.S. 
In the early days after liberation, said Rankovich, it had been 
necessary for the Yugoslav Government to undertake sweeping 
socialist measures ~ecause the Yugoslav people had demanded them. 
And they had been markedly friendly to the Soviet Union for the 
6S 
same reason. At that time they had not considered it necessary to 
push themselves forward in opposition to the Soviet Union as the 
leaders of a Balkan grouping because it had looked as if the Right 
was going to win in a number of Eastern European countries. If 
this had happened, bourgeois democratic States would have been set 
up and would readily have joined an American-sponsored military 
bloc under Yugoslav leadership, directed against Russia. 
But since the Communist parties were consolidating everywhere, 
including Hungary, Yugoslavia now had to come into the open and 
seek to change the line of the Hungarian and other parties. She 
must become the "organiser and guide" of the People's Democracies. 
Rankovich added that all this had been elaborated by Tito himself. 
But this new role was not an easy one to play, he declared, because 
the Communist parties were strong and so were the feelings of 
friendship for the Soviet Union. Some subtlety, therefore, would be 
required. Yugoslavia's strategic role in the fight against imperialism 
must be stressed (Rankovich probably had in mind here Ales 
Bebler's noisy and demonstrative outbursts against the British and 
Americans in the United Nations). The economic advantages of 
a Balkan bloc must be canvassed. Sports, cultural, and trade union 
bodies on a Balkan basis must be set up, with the Yugoslavs clearly 
in the lead. 
Finally-and this was the hard core of Rankovich's instructions-
immediate steps must be taken to prepare the overthrow of the 
regime in Hungary. He stated that similar actions were being ini-
tiated in other Eastern European countries at the same time, and 
gave Rajk clearly to understand that the plan was not a plan for 
Hungary alone. 
It was at this moment that Rankovich declared for the first time 
that the leaders of the Communist Party-Rakosi, Farkas, and 
Gero-would have to be assassinated. The term "physical liquida-
tion" was used. The meaning, however, was unmistakable. 
It is interesting to note that in his concluding remarks to Rajk, 
Rankovich extended the range of his observations somewhat and 
and declared that Rajk's actions in Hungary were part of a whole 
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series of measures, some of them of international significance. He 
mentioned that the adoption of the Marshall Plan in Europe would 
aggravate the economic difficulties of the People's Democracies, 
presumably by splitting Europe's economy in two. This should 
strengthen the reactionary elements in Eastern Europe, and serve 
also as a basis for economic unification in the Balkans. Further, 
the war talk in the West was also useful because it sowed doubt 
and confusion in the minds of the politically immature, who in their 
panic might be expected to turn towards the United States. Also, 
strong propaganda campaigns from the British Labour Party, and 
the French and Italian (Saragat) Socialists might be expected 
to help. 
At the very end of his remarks he stressed that should Rajk work 
successfully he could count on the aid of Hungarian-speaking mili-
tary units from Yugoslavia. 
The Kelebia meeting produced rapid results. By now Rajk had 
clearly before him the intoxicating vision of complete personal 
power. Surveying his forces at that moment he had every reason 
to feel confident. The whole of the State security apparatus, includ-
ing the police, was in his hands. Palffy, an absolutely reliable man, 
had largely rebuilt the cadres of the old fascist army. In almost 
every Ministry there were key men who were in the grip of the 
Yugoslavs and could be counted upon to support a putsch. And 
now Rankovich had indicated clearly that he would send troops 
across the frontier to help. 
Bemused and fascinated by the game he was playing, inflated too 
by the knowledge that the British Foreign Office and the u.S. State 
Department were behind him, it is not surprising that Rajk went 
back to work in Budapest with a will. 
Already, before Kelebia, he had carried out a number of special 
assignments for Rankovich. At the summer elections, for instance, 
he had argued inside the Communist Party in favour of an electoral 
campaign directed exclusively against the Right-wing parties, leaving 
the Right Social Democrats alone. He suggested that this was nec-
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essary because the party could not fight on two fronts at once. He 
knew, of course, that this strategy was the one best suited to the 
needs of the Western Powers, who had long since abandoned their 
friends on the extreme Right and were now supporting the Right 
Wing of the Social Democratic Party. 
Now, after the meeting at Kelebia, he received a further message 
from Rankovich, instructing him to do what he could to reduce 
the influence of the Communist Party among the rank and file of 
the police. He did this by the simple expedient of dissolving all the 
party organisations in the police force, including the Communists. 
Later, the same trick was to have been employed in the army. 
It is here that former Lieutenant, now Colonel, Bela Korondy 
returns to the scene. It will be recalled that this one-time officer in 
Horthy's Army joined the Political Department of the new Army 
under Palffy in August 1945. There he had helped Palffy to bring 
the old fascist cadres back from retirement. But in November 1946 
he had been transferred to the Ministry of the Interior, where Rajk 
placed him in command of a department of the armed police, with 
the task of organising special police formations. In the spring of 
1947 Rajk instructed him to form a highly mobile and well-armed 
'motorised battalion, its officers to be drawn from Palffy's carefully 
screened and indoctrinated Frontier Guard. This formation had 
heavy arms and was a formidable striking force. 
In March of 1948 Colonel Korondy was summoned to Rajk's 
office in the Ministry. Here is how he later described the scene: 
"He [Rajk] asked me emphatically, so that one could feel that 
this was important, whether I was willing to fulfil his personal 
orders and commands. When I replied in the affirmative he in-
formed me that he was preparing an armed putsch against the 
'Government and his intention was for me to organise a special 
detachment, with whose help I could arrest the members of the 
Government, in the first place, Ministers Rakosi, Farkas and Gero." 
At about this time, too, Rajk had a conversation with Selden 
Chapin, the u.s. Minister in Budapest. Rajk, as he was to confess 
later, told him that he had spoken with Rankovich at Kelebia, and 
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had been informed there that "when the time came for action, the 
United States would try to time something for them, to tie down 
the Soviet Union and so to prevent the Soviet Union from inter-
fering in the seizure of power in Hungary." Chapin was a little 
hesitant at first, but later admitted that he knew of the Yugoslav 
plan, adding that "America would not put any obstacles in the way 
of carrying out Yugoslavia's policy." 
It was also at this time that Rajk tried to carry out the Yugoslav 
instruction to organise various Balkan associations as a means of 
strengthening Yugoslav influence among trade unionists, young 
people, and so forth. But now, for the first time, the conspirators 
were to meet serious difficulties. 
So far, the whole conspiracy had been childishly easy for men 
schooled in the police forces of Eastern Europe. They had needed 
nothing more than those elementary precautions outlined in the 
textbooks of every intelligence organization in the world. They had 
placed their men in more key posts than they had dared to hope for. 
They had the Minister of the Interior, who was also one of the lead-
ing figures of the Communist Party and a highly popular person-
ality in the country. Inside the Communist Party, their chief enemy, 
they had the chief and deputy chief of the Cadres Department-the 
department responsible for recommending personnel for every kind 
of job. They had the Frontier Guard and the Political Department 
of the Army. And they were working not through the Americans 
or the British, with the constant dangers attendant upon such con-
tacts, but through the unsuspected Yugoslavs-representatives of a 
State which was still regarded as a model of the new type of Popular 
Democracy. It was only now, as the year 1948 wore on, that diffi-
culties began to appear. 
Early in the year, talks on unification of the Communist and So-
cial Democratic parties were started, and this led, in June, to the for-
mation of the united Hungarian Workers' Party. In the drastic re-
shufHe of jobs which ensued, many of Rajk's agents were ousted. 
Some of the hopes they had placed in the reactionary leadership of 
the Catholic Church were also shattered when in the early part of 
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the year the Government took serious measures to curb the political 
activities of the bishops, led by Cardinal Mindszenty, and placed the 
Church schools under the control of the State. 
But these blows were as nothing to an event which took place at 
Bucharest in the second half of June 1948. This event was to remove 
the Tito plot from the back rooms of the Embassies and Foreign 
Ministries and thrust it, for the first time, into the searching light of 
of day. From June onwards, the political line of Tito and Rankovich 
was to be discussed openly by working people in every part of the 
world. 
In the course of 1947, nine Communist parties of Europe (the 
Soviet, Polish, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Rumanian, Yugoslav, Czech· 
oslovak, French, and Italian) had created the Communist Informa· 
tion Bureau, with its headquarters in Belgrade. Now, on June 28, 
at the conclusion of a secret meeting in the Rumanian capital which 
the Yugoslavs refused to attend, the Bureau issued a document of 
lasting historic significance-the Resolution of the Information Bu-
reau on the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. 
Tito and his friends had known for some time that the blow was 
coming, because Rajk, as a member of the Political Bureau of the 
Hungarian Workers' Party, had prior knowledge of the proposed 
resolution and had dutifully communicated the gist of it to Belgrade. 
But nothing could be done to stop a move which was to expose 
Tito and his group and expel them from the ranks of international 
commUnIsm. 
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10. The Information Bureau Acts 
FROM WHAT we know of the situation in the Communist Party of 
Yugoslavia as far back as 1943, we will not be surprised to observe 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union paying sharp attention 
to some of the activities of the Yugoslav leaders during the years 
1945 to 1948. At the time the incidents in question no doubt 
appeared as weaknesses or mistakes, certainly in large measure a re-
sult of that overweening confidence and pride which had become 
an outstanding characteristic of the group around Tito. 
As far back as May 1945 Tito made a speech at Ljubljana which 
indicated his poor grasp of Marxism and, to put the matter at its 
mildest, an attitude towards the Soviet Union which must be re-
garded as remarkable in a leading member of a Communist Party. 
Speaking of Trieste, to which Yugoslavia was then laying an insist-
ent claim, and which had become a cause of grave international 
tension, Tito said : "We demand that everyone be master in his own 
house; we will not pay the accounts of others; we do not like to 
provide the cash for other people's exchanges; we don't wish to be 
mixed up in a policy of spheres of interest." 
This statement could only be interpreted as an allegation that Yu-
goslavia was in danger of becoming the victim in a squabble be-
tween the Soviet Union and the Western powers; but in fact the 
Soviet Union was supporting the Yugoslav claims to Trieste because 
they were just and in spite of the intense difficulty of the diplomatic 
battle. It is not surprising that the Soviet Government had occasion 
to make some criticism to the Yugoslav leaders over this unguarded 
and significant outburst by the Marshal. 
Yugoslav Foreign Minister Kardelj had an interview on the 
matter with the Soviet Minister in Belgrade, Sadchikov, on June 
5. At that interview Kardelj, taken somewhat off his guard, agreed 
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with the Soviet criticism of Tito's speech, and in the words of Sad-
chikov's subsequent report, "stated that Tito ... is somewhat in-
clined to consider Yugoslavia as a self-sufficient country, and stand-
ing outside relations with the development of the proletarian revolu-
tion and Socialism. Secondly, in the party things had reached such 
a pass that the Central Committee as an organised political centre 
had ceased to exist." 
This remark of Kardelj's is revealing, both as an appreciation of 
Marshal Tito and as an illustration of his own duplicity, since there 
can no longer be any doubt that he himself had exactly the same 
political position as Tito and the rest of his group at that time. 
In the early years after the war Mr. Molotov told Kardelj and 
Djilas that General Velebit, the Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister, 
was a British agent. The Soviet Government declared that it was 
prepared to vouch for the fact. So certain, indeed, were the Russians 
that by 1948 the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs was refusing to 
deal with the Yugoslav Government through their Foreign Minis-
try. Yet the Yugoslav leaders, beyond saying vaguely that Velebit's 
past life was being investigated, did nothing about the case."" 
By 1945, anti-Soviet talk had become general in the circles of the 
Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party. The general 
line was to call the Soviet Communist Party decadent, to speak of 
"Soviet chauvinism," and to suggest that Soviet socialism had ceased 
to be revolutionary-the standard of the revolution having been 
taken up by the Yugoslavs. By that time the Central Committee had 
been almost entirely cleared of the genuine Marxists and packed 
with Tito's personal supporters. 
This Central Committee had originally been elected at a secret 
conference of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia on October 19-
23, 1940. At that time, twenty-two members and sixteen candidates 
were elected. Of these original regular members ten were killed in 
• This incident, and that concerning the Ljubljana speech, appear in the v.er-
sion of the subsequent correspondence between the Central Committees of 
the Soviet and Yugoslav Communist parties which was published by the 
Yugoslavs themselves. There appears to be no reason to doubt their authen-
ticity. 
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action during the war and sixteen new members were co-opted. 
Thus, by the end of the war, it had ceased to be a representative 
body, and it had a majority of co-opted members. 
Part of the fight against the Marxists in the Central Committee 
had centred on Andrija Hebrang and Sreten Zujovich. These two 
Marxists of long standing had repeatedly opposed Rankovich and 
Tito in the period when the Tito group was coming under the in-
fluence of the British mission. Later, when the deviations of the 
group had visibly degenerated into betrayal, the criticisms of Heb-
rang and Zujovich became more outspoken. A climax was reached 
at the meeting of the Central Committee held in the first half of 
April 1948. At that meeting Hebrang and Zujovich made a spirited 
defence of the policy of the Soviet Union, and supported criticisms. 
which the Communist Party of the Soviet U nioR was already 
making of the Yugoslav party. It is significant to note that the 
Tito group subsequently admitted in an official document on the 
Hebrang-Zujovich "case" that one of their criticisms at this meeting: 
was that there was no freedom of discussion inside the CentraL 
Committee. 
The Tito clique obtained from the obedient majority the-
appointment of a commission of enquiry, headed by that Ivan 
Goshnjak who had been a Trotskyist in Spain and was now Tito's.. 
deputy. The commission found, not surprisingly, that Hebrang 
and Zujovich had committed every crime in the political calendar. . 
All the familiar charges of factionalism, hindering economic re-
covery, treachery, and so forth, were produced, plus a charge of 
having dubious relations with the Germans. This, from Rankovich. 
and Goshnjak, was the supreme irony. 
Armed with the findings of the commission, Rankovich and his. 
associates were quick to act. Hebrang was dismissed from his post 
of President of the Economic Council and Zujovich was also. 
stripped of his appointments. Immediately afterwards they were 
expelled from the party and thrown into jail. 
Something of what was happening from 1945 to 1948 was natur-
ally becoming clear to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union .. 
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They could see some of the unavoidable outward signs which were 
beginning to demonstrate that the Tito regime was not a genuine 
Popular Democracy, and that the Yugoslav Communist Party had 
fallen into the hands of Trotskyists and nationalists. 
By the third month of 1948 the accumulation of such evidence was 
overwhelming. The strange facts manifest for so long in Belgrade 
and understandably dismissed heretofore as honest mistakes, could 
no longer be overlooked. The Soviet missions in the Yugoslav cap-
ital were being trailed and their work hindered. It was clear that 
members of the Yugoslav Communist Party, which was still an 
underground conspiracy in organisational form, no longer had the 
minimum democratic rights. It was clear, too, that the class struggle 
inside Yugoslavia was being progressively abandoned. 
On March 18 Tito was informed that the Soviet military mission, 
originally sent at the request of the Yugoslavs, would be withdrawn. 
On March 19 the Soviet civilian specialists who were advising the 
Yugoslav Government were also recalled. On March 20 Marshal 
Tito addressed a letter of pained surprise to Mr. Molotov. In reply 
a letter was sent on March 27 from the Central Committee of the 
Soviet Communist Party to Marshal Tito and the Yugoslav Central 
Committee. This letter outlined some of the aspects of the situation 
inside Yugoslavia which were causing concern to the Soviet 
Marxists. 
There followed, between March and June 20, an exchange of 
letters in which the Soviet Communist Party made its position clear 
beyond a shadow of doubt, while the Yugoslavs confined themselves 
to an undocumented denial of everything. The other members of 
the Communist Information Bureau were kept informed of these 
developments, and when they finally met in Bucharest in the second 
half of June, they had been able to form a new estimate of Tito's 
Yugoslavia. 
The hi~toric document produced by the Bucharest meeting finally 
exposed the leadership of the Yugoslav party for all to see. 
"The Information Bureau notes that the leadership of the Yugo-
slav Communist Party has been carrying out of late, on the basic 
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questions of foreign and home policy, an incorrect line which rep-
resents a deviation from Marxism-Leninism," it declared. 
" ... In Yugoslavia it is not the Communist Party that is being 
regarded as the country's principal and leading force, but the 
People's Front. The Yugoslav leaders belittle the role of the Com-
munist Party, and are in fact dissolving the party in the People's 
Front ... The Information Bureau considers that the bureaucratic 
regime established inside the party by the Yugoslav leaders is dis-
astrous for the life and development of the Yugoslav Communist 
Party. The party does not have any internal party democracy; elec-
tions are not held; there is no criticism or self-criticism. 
" ... Such an organisation as the Yugoslav Communist Party 
cannot be called other than sectarian-bureaucratic. It leads to the 
party's liquidation as an active body with an initiative of its own, 
cultivates military methods of leadership within the party similar to 
those that once were implanted by Trotsky. It is quite intolerable 
that in the Yugoslav Communist Party the most elementary rights 
of party members are being trampled upon, that the slightest criti-
cism of the incorrect way in which things are run in the party is 
followed by grave repression. 
"The Information Bureau regards as disgraceful such facts as the 
exclusion from the party and the arrest of the members of the Cen-
tral Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia Comrades 
Zujovich and Hebrang because they dared to criticise the anti-Soviet 
attitude of the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party and to 
advocate friendship between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The 
Information Bureau considers that the Communist Party cannot 
tolerate such an ignominious, purely despotic terrorist regime. The 
interests of the very existence and development of the Communist 
Party of Yugoslavia demand that an end be put to such a 
regime." 
The Resolution then said that by their actions the Yugoslav lead-
ers had betrayed the cause of the international working class and 
placed themselves outside the family of fraternal Communist parties 
and outside the Information Bureau. 
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For the Yugoslav leadership it was the end of the period of facile 
duplicity. They could no longer present themselves as friends of the 
Soviet Union and enemies of the imperialist powers, and hope that 
anyone would believe them. 
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II. The Murder of Milos Moich 
THE EFFECTS produced by the Information Bureau's Resolution were 
profound. To the Communist movement throughout the world, 
which had come to regard Tito's Yugoslavia as a heroic model of a 
whole people striding towards socialism, the revelation of this great~ 
est betrayal in the history of the working class came as a profound 
shock. But the Resolution was so explicit in its accusations, and the 
Yugoslav leaders themselves were soon to demonstrate so clearly 
where they really stood, that people were quick to understand and 
learn from what had been revealed. 
For honest and clear-headed Yugoslav Communists who had 
neither been terrorised by Rankovich's political police nor crazed by 
adoration of the Marshal, the Resolution came as a call to duty. In-
side Yugoslavia the first Communist Party members openly to express 
agreement with the Resolution were seized by the police and thrown 
into jail. Carefully staged meetings of different bodies throughout 
the country obediently passed resolutions of worship for Tito. To 
any Communist trained in the traditions of self-criticism and open 
recognition, or at least discussion, of mistakes, these servile and gr~ 
tesquely over~simplified resolutions carried no conviction what~ 
ever. 
It was clear from the start that Tito and his friends were staging 
demonstrations of support by the Communist Party which were 
nothing but a sham on a colossal scale. 
For those Yugoslavs outside the country, in Legations and Embas~ 
sies, or simply living abroad, the Resolution offered a clear chance to 
work for the salvation of their country. They could resign from their 
various posts and join the free Yugoslav Communist movement 
which immediately sprang into being in the People's De~ 
mocraCles. 
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Among those who had been impressed by the Information 
Bureau's Resolution was a Hungarian of Yugoslav origin named 
Milos Moich. This man was active in the Federation of South Slavs 
of Hungary. He had been an organised Yugoslav agent for some 
time, but pondering the criticism of the international Communist 
movement, he determined to break with Tito and make a public 
statement. 
The Presidency of the South Slav Federation had, until t~e sum-
mer, been held by a certain Anton Rob. This Rob, who was a 
member of the Hungarian Parliament thanks to the intervention on 
his behalf of Tibor Szonyi in the Communist Party Cadres Depart-
ment, had been a leading Yugoslav intelligence agent since 1945. 
After the publication of the Resolution it was decided that the at-
mosphere had become too oppressive for him in Budapest, and he 
was provided by the Yugoslav Legation with forged papers and 
smuggled across the frontier to Yugoslavia in a Legation car. 
Now the post had become vacant. Moich had made no secret of 
his support for the Information Bureau. A movement developed 
inside the South Slav Federation, where rank and file feeling against 
Tito was strong, to elect him to the Presidency. 
But Moich underestimated the D.D.B. He would have been 
better advised to tread warily and work on the assumption that the 
Yugoslavs would go to any lengths to prevent their former agent 
from telling what he knew. Brankov informed Belgrade of the 
anticipated defection of Moich and in reply received instructions 
from Minister of the Interior Rankovich to have him either put across 
the frontier into Yugoslavia, or failing that, murdered. It is interest-
ing to note that it was Andras Szalai, assistant chief of the Cadres 
Department of the Communist party, who first came to hear of the 
proposed nomination of Moich and promptly informed the Legation. 
He was told in reply, on Brankov's behalf, that Moich would be risk-
ing his life if he accepted. 
This conversation between Szalai and the Yugoslavs took place on 
July 8. Two days later, on the tenth, a meeting was held in the room 
of Yugoslav Minister Mrazovich at the Legation in Dozsa Gyorgy 
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Street. Present were Zivko Boarov, Yugoslav press attache; Lazar 
Brankov, Counsellor of the Legation and chief of the U.D.B.; 
Blazich, another U.D.B. officer; and the Minister himself. At this 
meeting Boarov was selected to carry out the assassination of Moich, 
on the grounds that being a Serb he was closest to the intended vic-
tim. The Minister handed Boarov his own revolver for the purpose. 
That evening Boarov went to Moich's flat. First he tried to per-
suade him to come to the Legation to talk the matter over, but Moich 
was at least wary enough to refuse the invitation. Certainly, if he 
had gone there he would have been kidnapped like Ljubitsa Ribar 
and delivered in due course to the tender mercies of Rankovich's 
O.Z.N.A. Then, according to Boarov's later evidence at the Rajk 
trial, Moich was told that he was playing with his life. A quarrel 
developed. Finally, Boarov drew Mrazovich's revolver from his 
pocket, shot Moich, and made his escape. 
But the job had been badly bungled. As Boarov left the building 
he was seen by Moich's woman friend who was on her way up to the 
flat. When she got there she found Moich lying in a pool of blood. 
But he was not dead. She asked him if Boarov had shot him, and he 
was able to answer yes. Then he died. 
The woman then called the police and steps were taken at once to 
secure Boarov's arrest. But that individual had taken refuge in the 
Yugoslav Legation, where he was protected by extra-territorial rights, 
and refused to come out. 
There ensued a lengthy exchange of notes between the Hungarian 
and Yugoslav Governments, with a careful police watch on the Lega-
tion to ensure that the bird did not flyaway. Finally, the police 
obtained possession of the person of Mr. Boarov and took him off to 
jail. He was to become one of the key witnesses in the Public Prose-
cutor's case against Rajk and Brankov. 
One of the tasks given to the Yugoslav spy ring in Hungary im-
mediately after the publication of the Communist Information 
Bureau's Resolution was the organisation of widespread propaganda 
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in favour of Tito. This was no longer the simple matter it had been 
before, for now Tito had been outlawed by the international Com-
munist movement. The great flood of propaganda material in many 
languages from the printing presses in Belgrade could only come into 
the Popular Democracies by illegal means. To bring the material 
into Hungary the services of General George Palffy were enlisted. 
He was asked by a Yugoslav Legation official named Zokalj to 
select a number of points along the frontier at which parcels of litera-
ture could be safely got across. As head of the Frontier Guard of the 
Hungarian Army, Palffy had little difficulty in arranging the matter. 
He chose five places on the border, three in Trans-Danubia and two 
between the Danube and the Tisza. At these places the geographical 
formation made smuggling particularly easy, and the guards, already 
few in number, were further reduced for a while on Palffy's instruc-
tions. 
Supplementing Palffy's efforts, the Yugoslav Legation itself started 
to bring in supplies of literature. A Legation official named Lazar 
T orbica was sent back to Belgrade during the summer to collect 
propaganda material. What he brought back was distributed in 
Hungary through Boarov's press department to people on a mailing 
list compiled and supplied by Tibor Szonyi. 
But these ingenious and painstaking efforts to influence the people 
of Hungary, and in particular the Hungarian Communists, in favour 
of Tito, met with disappointing results. For the Information Bu-
reau's Resolution was being studied throughout the Party and had 
been thoroughly understood. 
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12. The Last Meeting-Paks 
DURING AUGUST Brankov visited Belgrade, where he had a long talk 
with Rankovich about the new situation produced by the Informa-
tion Bureau Resolution. The chief result of this conversation was a 
message from Rankovich to Rajk suggesting a meeting to plan a new 
strategy for their work in Hungary. On his return to Budapest, 
Brankov delivered the message, and Rajk agreed to a meeting, pro-
vided it were held secretly and within the boundaries of Hungary. 
His reasons for these stipulations were simple enough. Since June, 
the Yugoslav diplomats were regarded everywhere with the greatest 
suspicion. An open meeting at Ministerial level was bound to pro-
voke questions in the Government and the party. Further, Rajk 
himself was becoming nervous. The reorganisation following the 
formation in June of the united Hungarian Workers' Party had dis-
lodged many of his most reliable followers. The discussion of the 
Resolution was leading people to re-examine some of the recent 
actions of the Yugos avs and of those who had been their most out-
spoken advocates. 
And there was more than this. On August fifth the conspiracy 
suffered its most severe setback to date. By decision of the Govern-
ment and the leadership of the Hungarian Workers' Party, Rajk 
was transferred from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
To all appearances this was no demotion. But for Rajk the change 
was a disaster. No longer could he directly control the police and 
internal security organisations. More serious, perhaps, his successor at 
the Ministry of the Interior might become suspicious when he found 
what type of personnel had been collected together there by Rajk. 
For there was not one promoted worker to be found among the 
Ministry's top officials. Nearly all those holding key jobs were law-
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yers or former officials of the Horthy regime, or otherwise of dubious 
political antecedents. 
By no sign had the leaders of the Workers' Party indicated that 
they were in any way suspicious of Rajk. But Rajk himself could 
smell suspicion everywhere. He was convinced that the removal to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, if not a result of direct suspicion, 
was at least a precaution. And for a precaution to be taken, there 
must be somewhere, in however vague a form, some first doubts 
about him .... 
Rankovich agreed to a meeting inside Hungary, and the organisa-
tion was instructed to proceed with the affair. The planning and 
carrying out of this third meeting between the two men illustrates the 
high degree of perfection to which the plotters had brought their 
machine. 
At the beginning of October Rajk summoned General Palffy and 
told him to plan the crossing of the frontier. The need was to find a 
spot at which a car could cross without being challenged by the 
guards. It would bear a Hungarian number plate to lessen suspicion 
should it be seen after getting into Hungary. The crossing must be 
made somewhere in Trans-Danubia, as far East as possible, in day-
light; and the car would have to return on the arne day. 
Palffy declared that the thing could be done, and three or four days 
later he was able to report that a spot near the village of Udvar, some 
ten to twenty kilometres south of the town of Mohacs, had been 
selected. About two kilometres north of Udvar, the main road from 
Sszek to Mohacs runs along the frontier line, just inside Hungarian 
territory. Across the line are Yugoslav farmlands, crossed by a 
number of tracks. All a car would have to do would be to come up 
one of these tracks, stop at the main road, which was also the frontier, 
and after making sure that there were no patrols in sight, roll on to 
the highway and drive off on Hungarian territory. 
Palffy had arranged that the guard in the area should be so de-
pleted in numbers that only two sentries could be sent out daily. The 
chances of hindrance were thus reduced to a minimum. 
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This, in fact, was how Rankovich and two companions crossed 
the border. But before recounting what took place at the meeting, it 
is necessary to go back for a moment ... to the love affair of Yugoslav 
Minister in Hungary, Karlo Mrazovich. 
The girl who had attracted the eye of the imposing and handsome 
Yugoslav diplomat was a plain little school teacher named Gyorgi 
Tarisznyas. Her father was the town clerk at Paks, not far from the 
Yugoslav border, and Gyorgi taught in the school there. 
Near Paks was the big hunting reserve of Biritopuszta, belonging 
to a well-connected old aristocrat named Antal Klein. This decaying 
remnant of the old Hungary had been in the habit since the Dinnyes 
government had come into power in May 1947 of entertaining its 
less revolutionary members at hunting parties. At these parties, too, 
could sometimes be found diplomats, and old man Klein, being a 
host of long experience, went to some trouble to see that among his 
guests were people who could converse with the foreigners in their 
own tongues. Gyorgi Tarisznyas could speak some foreign lan-
guages, and so she had been invited to the estate one day in January 
1948. On this occasion, Mrazovich was one of the company. 
There is little point in speculating about the exact nature of the 
relationship between Gyorgi and the Yugoslav Minister. Suffice it 
to say that they met again shortly afterwards at a reception given by 
the Polish Legation at the Park Club in Budapest, and after that 
Mrazovich was frequently to be seen at Gyorgi's home in Paks. It 
was common talk in the town that he wanted to marry her. 
One day late in September, as she was returning from her work 
at the school, Gyorgi met Mrazovich near her house. Together they 
went to the Baumann Restaurant, where Antal Klein was taking a 
meal. Mrazovich complained that since the Resolution of the Com-
munist Information Bureau he had great difficulty in meeting his 
Hungarian friends. Would Klein be good enough to permit him to 
come down with some friends to hunt one day? And could Gyorgi 
accompany him? The answer in both cases was in the affirmative. 
Here we can quote the evidence given later by Antal Klein himself 
at the trial of Raj k : 
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"Mrazovich asked that, as he wanted to come down in his car with 
one or two friends, I should do him the favour of coming by carriage 
to the so-called Road 6, the main Budapest-Szekszard road, to the 
116th kilometre stone, where the lane meets the road. I should wait 
for him there and take him further as no car could pass along the 
sandy lane. He asked that I should drive the horse and carriage be-
cause he wanted to hunt incognito. I promised to do this. 
"A few days later, at the beginning of October, I went to the main 
road, Road Six, with my carriage at the stipulated time, where the 
main road crosses the lane. About half an hour later Minister Mrazo-
vich arrived. He and a man wearing a green felt coat and black 
spectacles, whom I did not know, got out of the car. After a short 
greeting both of them seated themselves in my carriage. I drove the 
carriage along the lane as far as the edge of Biritopuszta. I stopped 
a good distance from the buildings. 
"They got off, together with Gyorgi Tarisznyas, took with them 
the food brought by Gyorgi Tarisznyas as well as two guns, and 
went into the hunting reserve. They asked me to wait for them. 
They would return in about two to two and a half hours' time, when 
I should take them back to the car on the main road. Then they left. 
What happened then I do not know. They returned two and a half 
hours later and then I took them back by carriage to the main road." 
In her evidence Gyorgi Tarisznyas told how they reached a keep-
er's hut, and found a man in hunting clothes, carrying a gun, waiting 
for them there. This fact appeared to indicate that old Klein knew 
rather more than he cared to admit in court about the real purpose 
of the alleged hunting trip. 
Gyorgi described the man as of medium height and about forty 
years of age. When shown a photograph of Yugoslav Minister of the 
Interior Rankovich, she recognised the huntsman who had met them 
at the hut. Let us quote her evidence at the trial: 
"Mrazovich asked me to stay in the keeper's hut and prepare the 
snack. It struck me that this man had not been introduced to me, 
neither had the other one when he got out of the car. Then they 
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talked, walking up and down in front of the keeper's hut, and also 
farther away from the hut. Now and then they came close to me. 
I heard that one of the men was speaking in some Slav language. 
I am certain that it was not Russian, but perhaps Serb. The man in 
the green felt coat spoke Hungarian and Mrazovich interpreted be-
tween the two. 
"I could understand a few words of the conversation when they 
came near me, for instance that Mrazovich was speaking about Yugo-
slavia and said that action had to be taken. The other man, that is 
the one I did not know, spoke in that Slav language, so I could not 
understand what he was saying. Then they spoke about someone 
called Palffy who would be made Minister of Defence. I also heard 
the names of Ministers Rakosi and Farkas mentioned a number of 
times. 
"When they had finished their talk they came into the keeper's hut 
and ate a snack. Then we started on our way back to the carriage. 
The unknown man, however, went to his two companions and to-
gether they went in the direction of Csampapuszta." 
Presumably unbeknown to her, the little school teacher from Paks 
had been thrust that afternoon into the maelstrom of history. While 
she was preparing the food and grumbling to herself (she told the 
court later that she was in a bad mood because no one took any notice 
of her), the third meeting between Rankovich and Rajk was taking 
place, and plans were being laid for a military coup d'etat and the 
assassination of the leaders of Hungary. 
At the meeting Rankovich started off by outlining in detail to Rajk 
Tito's plan for the future inside Yugoslavia. We shall have occasion 
a little further on to observe how this plan actually worked out in 
practice. Suffice it to say here that Rankovich gave Rajk a prelim-
inary insight into the technique to be adopted to take the people of 
Yugoslavia out of the socialist camp into that of the imperial powers. 
Rankovich declared that the Information Bureau's Resolution did 
not affect the objective of a Balkan Federation, led by Yugoslavia; 
only the methods of bringing it about had now to be modified. It 
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was Tito's firm conviction that since the publication of the Informa-
tion Bureau Resolution there could no longer be any question of 
taking over power in the Popular Democracies in a peaceful way. 
The State power would have to be seized by means of a coup d'etat. 
He directed Rajk's attention to the economic measures being 
undertaken by the Western Powers under the terms of the Marshall 
Plan, designed to curb trade with Eastern Europe and thus provoke 
economic difficulties there. He added that full advantage should also 
be taken of the unprecedentedly violent campaign against the Gov-
ernment which had been started a little earlier by Cardinal Mind-
szenty. This , attack, said Rankovich, was not happening as a result 
of the personal ideas and convi€tions of Mindszenty. The Vatican 
was much concerned with halting the development of socialism in 
the People's Democracies. And whereas Mindszenty's opposition to 
the nationalisation of the Church schools had only produced one 
small peasant rising at Pocspetri earlier in the year, the new, bigger 
campaign should produce similar disturbances in every town and 
village in the country. 
Rajk could count on armed Yugoslav help from the very moment 
the projected putsch started, said Rankovich. Tito had authorised 
him to state that units of Hungarian-speaking Yugoslavs would be 
held ready just across the frontier, dressed in Hungarian uniforms. 
To make doubly sure, these units would be stiffened with Serb 
officers. 
At the same time as the armed rising, it was essential to arrest the 
Government and kill its leading members, Rakosi, Farkas, and Gero. 
Of course, said Rankovich, any appearance of brutality must be 
avoided. Perhaps it could be explained that one of them met with an 
accident, the second had died of some illness, and the third had com-
mitted suicide or had been shot while trying to escape. 
Tito regarded these three leaders as so dangerous that he absolutely 
insisted upon their "liquidation," and suggested for the purpose a 
unit consisting of picked Yugoslavs, "because they have excellent ex-
perience from the partisan struggles of how to get rid of people, and 
the supporters of the Resolution of the Information Bureau who had 
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been arrested or had tried to escape could also talk about this 
experience. " 
Rankovich also said that measures had already been taken to get 
in touch with former military units of the Horthy regime which 
were now stationed in the Anglo-American zones of Germany and 
Austria. These units would be brought into Hungary through Yugo-
slavia and would be available to take part is the putsch. Giving evi-
dence at his trial later, Rajk admitted that he knew such fascist units 
would have committed "acts of the greatest cruelty and barbarism 
against those democratic forces which have pushed them out of the 
country." 
Rankovich also announced that Kardelj and Djilas had worked out 
a plan whereby Yugoslavia would revive the charge that Hungary 
was seeking a revision of the frontiers. This charge, that Hungary 
sought to incorporate those Yugoslav territories inhabited by the 
Hungarians, would be followed by deliberately provoked frontier 
incidents which would then be blamed upon the Hungarians. We 
shall see in a moment how this line of attack was developed. 
After the meeting, Rajk returned to Budapest a troubled man. He 
was under pressure from his inexorable Yugoslav masters to lead a 
rising of the utmost danger. He believed that he himself was already 
under suspicion. But there was no retreat and no way out. 
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13. Spying In Moscow 
RANKOVICH had mentioned to Rajk at Paks that Yugoslavia was 
pushing ahead with espionage and the organisation of rebellion in 
the other Popular Democracies. It was also the case that the Yugo-
slavs were doing quite an amount of Britain's and America's espio-
nage for them in Moscow. Before the publication of the Information 
Bureau's Resolution, Yugoslav diplomats had been warmly received 
as allies in Moscow and were thus in a position to do a certain 
amount of quite effective spying if they wanted to. With the pub-
lication of the Resolution, however, the Soviet authorities took pre-
cautions as far as the Yugoslav Embassy was concerned. And so it 
was that Rankovich, here again, turned to his Hungarian friends. 
Among the agents recruited for the Yugoslavs by George Palffy 
was an officer named Dezso Nemeth. In the autumn of 1946 he 
became Chief-of-Staff of the Frontier Guard, and early in 1947 he 
was put in direct touch with Brankov, with instructions to give him 
any information he might require. From then until May 1948 
Nemeth fulfilled this assignment, apparently to the satisfaction of the 
U.D.B., for in May the U.D.B. asked Palffy to get him transferred if 
possible to the Hungarian Embassy in Moscow as Military Attache. 
As chief of the Army's Political Department, Palffy vouched for 
Nemeth and the transfer went through. Before going, Nemeth was 
instructed to continue his espionage for the Yugoslavs in the Soviet 
capital. Palffy stressed the need to establish close relations with the 
other Military Attaches in Moscow, who would be able to give him 
useful information. Among the items regarded as interesting to the 
Yugoslav (and presumably the American) intelligence services were 
the organisational structure, armament, supply position, and dis-
cipline of the Soviet Army. 
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Here is Dezso Nemeth's subsequent evidence at Rajk's trial con-
cerning his activities as Military Attache: 
"I entered into contact with Karlo Mrazovich, Yugoslav Ambassa-
dor to Moscow, in the spring of 1949 in Moscow.· We first met at a 
reception. Mrazovich approached me, and referring to Palffy and 
Brankov, told me that on the instructions of the Yugoslav intelligence 
organs and in their name, he would establish contact with me. After 
that he asked me what instructions Palffy had given to me. I told 
him about the instruction I had received from Palffy, and Mrazovich 
asked me, on the basis of these instructions, to hand over to him the 
espionage material I had collected until that time. 
"On the occasion of the next meeting which we had fixed before, 
and which was also at a reception, I handed over to Mrazovich in a 
closed envelope the espionage material containing data about the 
Soviet Army that I had collected. Mrazovich told me then that for 
reasons of secrecy we would in future always meet at receptions and 
we would use these good opportunities to talk with one another with-
out attracting any attention. 
"Mrazovich commissioned me to try to get secret data about the 
Soviet Army from the officers of the Ministry of Armed Forces of the 
Soviet Union and instructed me to find out the political views, con-
cerning Tito's policy, of the Military Attaches of the People's Democ-
racies and of the personnel of the Hungarian EmbaS6Y in 
Moscow. 
"I succeeded in collecting this espionage data because of the con-
fidence shown by the officers of the Soviet Army and the Military 
Attaches of the People's Democracies towards me in my capacity as 
the Military Attache of a friendly country. I handed over the 
espionage data I collected to Mrazovich on the occasion of our next 
meeting by word of mouth and again in writing, in a sealed enve-
lope: these data were almost entirely of a secret nature." 
• Mrazovich had by this time been transferred from Budapest to Moscow. 
In October, 1949, after the Rajk trial had revealed his espionage activities, 
the Soviet Government demanded his removal from the Soviet Union. 
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The case of Dezso Nemeth is instructive in that it helps to indicate 
the enormous value to the imperial powers of the subservient Yugo-
slav intelligence service. It illustrates, also, what a severe defeat for 
those powers was the publication of the Information Bureau's Reso-
lution, which hamstrung the activities abroad of the U.D.B. 
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I4. Lazar Brankov Repents 
ON OCTOBER 27 there took place in Budapest an event which 
thoroughly frightened everyone of the members of the conspiracy 
in the Hungarian Workers Party. On that day a number of Yugo-
slav officials signed a public declaration in which they broke with 
Tito and proclaimed their support for the criticisms of the Com-
munist Information Bureau. 
That this should occur was not surprising, since a number of 
Yugoslav Communists in different parts of the world had already 
done the same thing. But there was one name, at the top of the list, 
which frightened the plotters out of their wits. It was the name of 
Lazar Brankov. 
Brankov, as we know, was the head of the V.D.B. in Budapest. 
In the absence of Mrazovich he was now Charge d'Affaires at the 
Legation. He had been at the very centre of the conspiracy from the 
beginning, and he knew enough to land at least twenty people in jail 
on charges of treason. Would he speak? 
Terrible uncertainty was worsened four days later when a long 
statement appeared under Brankov's signature in Szabad Nep, the 
organ of the Hungarian Workers' Party. It was an uncompromising 
and violent attack upon Tito, and it gave some new facts about the 
repression inside Yugoslavia. Clearly, the whole conspiracy was 
about to go up in smoke. 
"The Resolution of the Information Bureau came as an aid and 
encouragement to the Communist parties of the world to examine, 
with Bolshevik self-criticism, whatever defects should appear in their 
wor k," wrote Brankov. 
"Influenced by the Resolution, every Communist Party in the 
world, with the exception of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, 
set about improving the quality of their work with great intensity. 
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· .. The Tito clique avoids the issue and talks about 'injuries' and 
'the honour of the nation,' vilely accusing the Soviet Union of har-
bouring 'covert intentions,' and at the same time it stabs the inter-
national working-class movement treacherously in the back by charg-
ing the Soviet Union with impeding the building of socialism in 
Y ugosla via." 
So far, things looked pretty bad. But there was far worse to come. 
"Our successes, especially those achieved during the people's war 
of liberation, and the acknowledgement we received for them from 
all over the world, led us to believe little by little that we were 
superior to other people. As a result, vigilance in our work slackened 
and we did not see the mistakes and errors we had committed in 
transforming and rebuilding our country. A severe blow had to be 
dealt to awaken us. . .. The Tito group has undermined the national 
and political independence of the peoples of Yugoslavia. 
" ... In the course of my talks with leading personalities of the 
Tito group in recent months, it has struck me that they all seemed 
to be interested in one particular thing: whether in the other Com-
munist parties, and in their leadership, there were people with anti-
Soviet opinions, and how such people could be contacted. 
"Rankovich has sent confidential telegrams in different directions 
telling us to defame both those comrades who, on account of their 
uncompromising internationalist stand, have either been killed or 
arrested in Yugoslavia, and those who have fled abroad in order to 
escape the increasingly savage terror in Yugoslavia .... Upon my 
comrades and me, who have signed the statement refusing to follow 
the Tito clique along the road of treachery, the title of embezzlers has 
been conferred by Rankovich. Yet it is known that neither I nor my 
comrades have ever been treasurers or handled public funds that 
could be embezzled. 
" ... The thugs of Rankovich are killing people off without legal 
procedure and then reporting that they have fled abroad. Relatives 
of the arrested or the assassinated are informed that they had better 
not try to make enquiries. Colonel-General Arso Jovanovich, the 
hero of the War of Liberation, was assassinated by order, after which 
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they arranged. what amounted to a real comedy, pretending that he 
had tried to slip across the border. This comedy was staged by officers 
of the V.D.B., who were promoted as a reward for it. 
"The prisons of Yugoslavia are crowded with Communists who 
have remained faithful to the international working·class movement. 
In the 'Glavnyacha,' the ill·famed prison of the late Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia, there are imprisoned such popular figures as Andrija 
Hebrang and Sreten Zujovich, both of them members of the Political 
Bureau of the party. Also in prison are, among others, Bozha Ljuko. 
vich, Vice·Premier of the Government of Montenegro, and those 
members of the Governments of Montenegro and Bosnia who had 
resigned their posts. 
"Prisons all over the country teem with members of various vii· 
lage, town, and district committees of the party .... Among those 
recently arrested are Sima Balen, director of Tanjug, as well as 
Djuro Shpolarich, member of the Central Committee of the Trade 
Unions, Comrade Shotra, author of Heroes of the People's War of 
Liberation, Comrade Novakov, the secretary of the Control Com· 
mittee in V ojvodina, and others. 
" ... Lies are circulated in the country alleging that the People's 
Democracies have claims on Yugoslav territories and that these 
claims are supported by the Soviet Union .... Tito and his clique, 
who have built up their authority with the blood of our peoples, at 
the price of the lives of tens of thousands of party members, now 
want to use this authority to break up the ideology of the inter-
national working class movement and to bring our country into the 
imperialist camp." 
The statement ended with a glowing tribute to Stalin and the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The outlook for the con· 
spirators was certainly gloomy. 
But they had no cause for concern. What they did not know 
as they read Szabad Nep on the morning of October 31, but were 
to find out soon afterwards, was that the fiery statement of Lazar 
Brankov was nothing but an extremely cunning and carefully 
elaborated provocation worked out between Rankovich in Belgrade 
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and the Yugoslav Legation in Budapest. Brankov was not changing 
sides. He did not agree with the Communist Information Bureau. 
But he was being sent among the Yugoslav Communist refugees 
to continue his work there. 
Re-read the Szabad Nep statement in the light of that fact and 
it emerges as one of the most cynically hypocritical documents in 
modern history. For Brankov's statement was in fact the absolute 
truth about Tito's Yugoslavia. 
Tito and his clique were arrogant, they were searching for anti-
Soviet elements in other. Communist parties, they were arresting 
and murdering their opponents and filling the jails with Com-
munists. It was true that Arso Jovanovich had been assassinated 
and Hebrang and Zujovich jailed. And it was true that Tito was 
spreading the lie that neighbouring countries had designs on Yugo-
slav territory. There was everything in the statement to make an 
honest man break with Tito. And it was in order to work more 
effectively for him that Brankov had published it. 
If Brankov's subsequent evidence at the trial is. to be believed-
though it is by no means trustworthy on the point-Rankovich 
had not found it easy to persuade him to take this extremely dan-
gerous step. 
In October, shortly after the secret meeting at Paks, Brankov had 
paid another visit to Belgrade and had there received instructions 
to pretend to change sides. The aim was to spy on the Yugoslav 
Communist refugees, and if possible collect material which the 
Yugoslav Government could use in order to prove that the Hun-
garian Government was intervening in Yugoslav internal affairs. 
The change would also enable him to keep an eye on Raj k without 
arousing suspicion. 
Brankov was unwilling to exchange the complete safety conferred 
by his immunity as a diplomat for the exposed position of an expa-
triate who would be subject to Hungarian law and certainly the 
object of the most careful political scrutiny by the Hungarian 
Workers Party. 
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When he got back to Budapest he thought things over and could 
not summon up the necessary courage to obey his orders. After a 
fortnight a letter arrived for him from Rankovich via the diplo-
matic bag. Rankovich, the master-spy and police chief, knew his 
man. If Brankov was unwilling to pretend to support the Com-
munist Information Bureau, he said, he would be treated by the 
Yugoslav authorities as if he really supported it. Further, measures 
would be taken against his family in Yugoslavia. Rankovich knew 
that Brankov was a coward and that only threats would move him 
in such a crisis. And Brankov immediately made the declaration 
of October 27. 
It was not until a few days later, during November, that he had 
a chance of telling the apprehensive Rajk that there was nothing 
to worry about. This he did when they met by chance in a cor-
ridor at the Workers Party headquarters. It is almost comic to note 
that Rajk betrayed signs of considerable fear at this unexpected 
encounter. He, the simple plotter, did not yet know that Brankov 
had gone one better and was now playing a double game. 
Brankov's contact with Belgrade was now maintained by means 
of an ingenious system of timed meetings with a member of the 
Legation staff in remote open land on the Gugger Hill. His task 
of maintaining contact with Palffy, Rajk, Szonyi, Szalai and the 
others was, of course, easy enough. But his own position was ex-
posed in the extreme. It is certain that Lazar Brankov, in those 
last brief months before his arrest, was a nervous and unhappy man. 
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IS. The Putsch Is Ready 
AND NOW we are nearing the climax of these extraordinary events. 
Rajk is back from Paks with clear instructions to organise an armed 
putsch as soon as he can. Lazar Brankov has made his public renun-
ciation of Tito and is still in Budapest, keeping an eye on the 
preparations. Szonyi and Szalai continue to scheme at the Cadres 
Department to get their men into key jobs and, what has now 
become far more difficult, to keep them there. And General George 
Palffy now enters the picture once more, as the organiser of the 
putsch itself. 
As we have already seen, difficulties had been piling up for the 
plotters since the beginning of 1948, and by early 1949 Laszlo Rajk 
was in a state of gloom regarding the possibilities of success. 
Brankov was increasingly certain that he himself was under suspi-
cion and liable to be trapped at any time. He had the feeling, and 
he was right, that the Workers Party was only pretending to trust 
him. 
Only the inexorable grip of Rankovich kept the plotters moving. 
Not one of them dared to defy the insistent instructions and urgings 
which de5cended with ever-greater frequency from the V.D.B. in 
Belgrade. 
At the end of October and again in November, Rajk was visited 
by Brankov and Yugoslav Minister Mrazovich. Belgrade was dis-
satisfied, they said, with the slow progress in Hungary. The troop 
concentrations across the Yugoslav border were fairly advanced. 
Rajk replied by quoting his difficulties. Cardinal Mindszenty, who 
had been greatly counted on to assist, had been arrested; the forma-
tion of the Hungarian People's Front had greatly strengthened the 
power of the Government; a thorough sifting of personnel in the 
Army and the Civil Service had ferreted out still more of Rajk's 
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men. It was all very difficult and Rankovich was being unreasonable. 
But Rankovich was not taking no for an answer. In the early 
months of 1949 he goaded Rajk and Palffy forward, partly with 
glowing tales of big troop formations ready to cross the frontier 
once the putsch started in Budapest, partly by assurances that the 
British and Americans had promised to organise a diversion to 
distract the attention of the Soviet Union, and partly by direct 
threats. 
Palffy was instructed to draw up a list of Army units which 
could be relied upon to seize key points in the capital and occupy 
the revolutionary working-class suburbs of Diosgyor, Salgotarjan 
and Ozd. He prepared a detailed plan for the occupation of the 
Workers Party headquarters, the Ministries of Defence and the 
Interior, the State Defence Authority, the Radio, the offices of 
Szabad Nep, the main railway stations, and other strategic points 
and buildings. The signal for the putsch was to be the murder of 
the three leaders of the Hungarian Workers Party-Matyas Rakosi, 
Erno Gero, and Mikhail Farkas. 
A number of different units were contemplated for the execution 
of this task. Colonel Bela Korondy had been £harged with the 
formation of three groups of about a dozen men each-fascists from 
Horthy's old gendarmerie-who could be trusted to seize the three 
Communist leaders and kill them on the spot. On the other hand, 
Rankovich had suggested that this all-important task should be 
entrusted to a picked group of Yugoslavs who could be sent to the 
Hungarian capital specially for the purpose. In the end, he actually 
sent to Budapest two experts in political assassination with the task 
of watching the movements of the three intended victims in order 
to work out a fool-proof routine to kill them. 
The first move in the putsch had to be carried out on a day when 
all three were sure to be in the capital for a meeting of the party's 
Political Committee or for a Council of Ministers. At Rajk's sug-
gestion the hour was tentatively fixed at 11 p.m., about the time 
when they could be expected to go home. The special assassination 
groups were to attack and disarm the staffs in each of their resi-
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dences and then murder them. A few days before May 1, Rajk 
discussed the matter in detail with Korondy, who reported that the 
groups would be ready. 
Palffy, meanwhile, had perfected his military plans. The putsch, 
starting with the murder of Rakosi, Gero, and Farkas in the evening, 
was to be completed by the following day when selected Army 
units from the provinces would reach the capital. Szonyi, mean-
while, was told to prepare for a party congress which would meet 
sometime during the summer and legalise the putsch in retrospect. 
This faked congress would confirm Rajk as leader of the party. 
While all this was going on, between November 1948 and May 
1949, it began to look as if the promised American efforts to distract 
the attention of the Soviet Union were getting under way. The 
Berlin crisis had started in June of 1948. By the end of the year 
the warlike threats in London and Washington had reached the 
highest pitch since the beginning of the cold war. The war atmos-
phere had become so serious that a worldwide peace movement 
came into being to combat it. 
In Washington in particular, threats to bomb Russia, to smash a 
way into Berlin, to fight the Soviet Union before she had the atom 
bomb, became current among leading Congressmen. An atmosphere 
was created in which events of the kind which were being planned 
by the Yugoslavs and Americans could most easily take place. 
On May 1 in Budapest the Hungarian working people celebrated 
their traditional holiday with a vast and enthusiastic parade. On 
the tribune, receiving the cheers and applause of the great crowd, 
stood Laszlo Rajk among the leaders of the Hungarian Workers 
Party. In the course of the parade, Rajk retired to the back of the 
tribune with General Palffy and discussed the fact that it no longer 
seemed possible to postpone the coup. Rankovich had insisted on 
fixing the date himself-presumably in consultation with the Amer-
icans-and only his signal was now awaited. The two men re-
marked to each other that the atmosphere of suspicion was increasing 
day by day, and not only towards Rajk himself. There were now 
signs that Palffy was also regarded with distrust by the party. 
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While the two conspirators laid their plans behind the gaily 
decorated tribune, the people of Budapest marched happily past, 
shouting slogans for peace and for the building of socialism. 
It will be recalled that Rankovich had told Rajk at the Paks 
meeting that frontier provocations would be organised and would 
be blamed on the Hungarians. These acts of terrorism on the fron-
tiers started during April. 
On the night of the twenty-fifth two Hungarian frontier guards 
were shot at point-blank range across the boundary line by Yugo-
slavs. Already, four days previously, an attempt had been made to 
put a concentration of agents across the frontier during the night. 
No less than one hundred were captured by the Hungarian authori-
ties. They consisted of former Horthy gendarmes, officers, soldiers, 
and other fascists who had fled to the West with the Germans. 
In both of these cases strong notes of protest were sent by the 
Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Yugoslav Govern-
ment. Rajk, the Foreign Minister, was particularly scrupulous about 
the formulation of these notes, constantly having them redrafted 
until the wording had just that sharpness and political point which 
would best serve their purpose. He knew, of course, that the provo-
cations were being planned by Rankovich in order to stir up the 
frontier population and thus help the putsch that he himself was 
to lead. 
On May 14 a Hungarian soldier standing 600 metres inside Hun-
garian territory was shot at and killed from the Yugoslav side. "The 
Hungarian Government rightly expected that the Government of 
the civilised and democratic people of Yugoslavia would take all 
measures to end the intolerable situation on the frontier," wrote 
Foreign Minister Rajk. "But in each case the Yugoslav Government 
ignored the events brought to their attention." 
On May 30 Yugoslav troops again opened fire across the border 
line and killed a Hungarian soldier named Miklos Vetesi. Again 
a stinging but quite hypocritical protest went out from Rajk's office 
to the authorities in Belgrade. 
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Only the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Big Four in 
May finally lessened the intolerable international tension. It began 
to look as if the conspirators had missed their chance. 
But Laszlo Rajk, spurred on no doubt by the desperation which 
.came from the increasingly certain knowledge that the authorities 
were about to act, informed Palffy and the other leading conspira-
tors that the general aim should be to start the action in the last 
<lays of Mayor the beginning of June. 
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16. The Arrests 
BUT AT LAST the authorities decided that the time had come when 
the conspiracy must be smashed. 
Both Brankov and Rajk were right in sensing that they had been 
under suspicion for some time. Rajk, in particular, exposed to the 
searching test of constant political debate in the party's Political 
Bureau, must have found the strain of the last months intolerable. 
To the acute and intelligent men by whom he was surrounded (far 
more cultured and penetrating Marxists than he could ever pretend 
to be) his actions, the political line that he was forced by Rankovich 
to adopt, and the weakness in his theoretical understanding which 
the complex and developing situation undoubtedly began to reveal, 
all served to confirm the first vague suspicions against him. And 
the conclusion reached in this way was being further confirmed 
and strengthened by the evidence the police had been steadily 
collecting. 
At last the police put into operation their carefully timed plan to 
mop up the conspirators. On May eighteenth both Tibor Szonyi 
and Andras Szalai were arrested.'*' 
To Rajk, the arrest of Szonyi and Szalai must have been a certain 
warning that he himself could not escape for long. Whatever the 
police may have known before, it was hardly to be expected that 
either Szalai or Szonyi would refrain from incriminating Raj k 
without delay as the chief of the conspiracy and the man whose 
orders they had been carrying out. 
In fact, Rajk had only twelve days to wait. In the early hours of 
• At the time of his arrest Szalai still had on his desk a large photograph of 
Endre Sagvari, the Communist martyr killed by the gendarmerie in the garden 
of the Buda pastry shop in 1944. Szalai had been in the habit of pointing to 
that picture when members of the party came to him, and sternly exhorting 
them to be true Communists like Sagvari. 
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Monday, May thirtieth, he was quietly arrested at his home. 
Paul Justus was taken into custody on June eighteenth. He had 
been at his office at the Hungarian Radio during the day. On his 
way home by car, he saw a police car draw ahead and signal his 
chauffeur to the side of the road. In two moments Justus had 
changed cars and was on his way to jail. 
George Palffy was meanwhile in an agony of suspense. His agony 
was to last one month more. It was not until July eighteenth that 
he was arrested. And on the following day Lazar Brankov, former 
Yugoslav Charge d'Affaires and chief of the U.D.B. in Hungary, 
was also taken to jail. 
Throughout this period the lesser conspirators were being mopped 
up, and as they waited their turn, in the hope that they would be 
missed but in the knowledge that it was highly unlikely, they tried 
in their various ways to appear utterly innocent. 
The plot, of course, had become a matter for some discussion 
among those who had known the arrested men. The remaining 
plotters tried to put on airs of flippancy and light-heartedness. No 
one was more punctilious in applying the new regulations for the 
security of Government offices which were naturally enough intro-
duced at this time than the very men whose conspiracy had been 
designed to seize every Ministry in the capital. One man, at the 
Prime Minister's Office, became a famous model for security-minded-
ness. But it did not save him from detection and capture. Another, 
at the Radio, developed his own line in jokes about the probable 
guilt of everyone in sight, and kept the whole place laughing until 
he, too, was picked up. 
From the Premier's office, the Ministries of the Interior, Foreign 
Affairs, and Public Welfare, from the Hungarian-Soviet Oil Co., 
the Army, the Police, the Federation of South Slavs, and many other 
organisations, the plotters were ferreted out and rounded up. The 
cleansing took some months to complete, but it was a thorough job. 
The Hungarian police have naturally not revealed the shape of 
the investigations and the order in which the facts were disclosed. 
But it can be assumed that quite a number of the arrested men were 
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perfectly ready to betray their fellow-conspirators and attempt to 
shift their guilt on to everyone in sight. This process, coupled with 
the most careful and painstaking collection of direct evidence over 
what must have been a considerable period of time, enabled the 
Public Prosecutor's office to build up a damning and water-tight case. 
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17. The Rajk Trial 
THE TRIAL of Laszlo Rajk and seven of his fellow-conspirators 
opened in the main hall of the metal workers' trade union in Buda-
pest at 9 a.m. on Friday, September 16, 1949. The case was tried 
by the Special Council of the Budapest People's Court, presided 
over by Dr. Peter Janko, who sat with four lay magistrates. The 
various charges of sedition, war crimes, espionage, and attempting 
to overthrow the democratic order in Hungary were presented by 
the Public Prosecutor, Dr. Gyula Alapi. The defendants were repre-
sented by counsel of their own choice. 
Side by side with Rajk on the row of chairs for the accused in 
front of the judges' platform sat George Palffy, Lazar Brankov, 
Dr. Tibor Szonyi, Andras Szalai, Milan Ognjenovich, Bela Korondy, 
and Paul Justus. In the body of the court were several hundred 
members of the public-workers from the factories of Budapest, 
office employees, and peasants from the neighbouring countryside. 
There were forty-seven foreign press representatives from fourteen 
countries, in addition to the press of Hungary. 
Little purpose would be served by attempting to paint a picture 
here of the full human drama which was played out in court during 
the week of the trial. Everything went to make a trial unique in 
modern history: the scope of the plot, its international ramifications, 
the prominence of the accused, the close attention of the whole 
world. Our narrative so far has given us the essence of the pro-
ceedings, since the details of the conspiracy that we have outlined 
were nearly all revealed in the lengthy personal statements of the 
accused, and the evidence of numerous witnesses. 
It is well known that, without exception, the eight plotters pleaded 
guilty and proceeded to confess everything they knew. And this 
fact, common enough in political trials of this character, provoked 
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as usual a spate of partly genuine and partly ill-intentioned specula--
tions in the Western countries. Yet there is nothing mysterious at.. 
all in these confessions. 
First let us quote Dr. Tibor Szonyi himself on the subject: 
"I have during my examination here, as earlier before the investi- · 
gation authorities, perfectly sincerely and frankly told everything I 
know and knew in connection with the charge. However, the fact 
that even before my arrest I lacked an inner conviction of the right-
ness of what I was doing, contributed to a great extent to the fact 
that I could sincerely and openly expose what was known to me . . 
I have repented of my actions and tried with all sincerity-as far as . 
this is possible so belatedly and under such circumstances-to make 
amends for my guilty actions. 
"I consider it necessary to state this here and to emphasise it, . 
because I know from experience that in trials of a political character 
certain circles and certain expert writers have the habit of spreading 
the story that confessions of guilt of the accused are made under ' 
duress, or are due to certain drugs, injections, or suggestion. I am 
a physician and a neurologist, and I have known for a long time 
that such things are impossible. And now I have learnt from my 
own experience that such things are out of the question. The sole 
reason for my sincere confession is that I made up my mind to be ' 
sincere, in order to make good what little can be made good at all 
in connection with such a grave crime." 
To this Lazar Brankov added in the course of his last speech· 
that he considered it necessary to state that he had spoken the truth, . 
but not under any coercion. "This is my answer to those who will 
say that I confessed something under coercion, or that some narcotic 
medicine was used. I consider it my duty to declare squarely here, 
in front of the People's Court, why I have told about everything ' 
and why I have told about everything sincerely." 
Brankov then went on to explain at some length that he had an, 
extraordinarily bad conscience and hoped by confessing to put right 
some of the wrong he had done to the people of Hungary. 
We need not be too much concerned for the moment with the " 
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belated repentance of men who, had they won instead of losing, 
would certainly have shown not a shade of mercy towards their 
unfortunate victims. What concerns us, since it appears to puzzle 
so many people, is the reason for the confessions. And before going 
further, it can be said that not one of the foreign, and frequently 
hostile, press representatives at the trial believed for a moment that 
either drugs, terror, or physical violence had been used to obtain 
them. 
All of the accused looked far fitter than one would have expected 
of men who had been under the strain of expecting shortly to be 
condemned to death. All of them spoke coherently and at length, 
and betrayed all the small signs of temperamental and psychological 
differentiation which would not be present had they been hypno-
tised or otherwise not in control of their faculties. 
The nonsense about drugs and beatings, then, can be consigned 
to limbo with the baby-talk about unexpected and overwhelming 
kindness by the jailers being responsible for the psychological break-
down, and hence the confessions, of the prisoners. 
These people confessed, primarily, because they were confronted 
with absolutely overwhelming and inescapable proof. It is absurd 
to imagine that a police service capable of unearthing a conspiracy 
as carefully concealed as this would suddenly be seized with paralysis 
when it came to collecting evidence. It is obvious that once the plot 
was suspected and the plotters kept under observation, they were 
bound to give unlimited evidence against themselves. 
Secondly, we are not dealing here with a band of idealistic 
brothers, but with participants in a dog-eat-dog game of espionage, 
where anyone would betray his fellow if he thought it would miti-
gate his own crime. All their lives these men had been cheating 
and betraying, and it would be fantastic if now, in the biggest and 
most dangerous crisis of all, they suddenly adopted a high and 
unshakable moral tone. 
Thirdly, there can be little doubt that the enormity of the crime 
they had committed preyed heavily on the minds of at least some 
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of the eight. And the probability of this is surely underlined on 
almost every page of this narrative. 
Several of the accused pleaded in mitigation of their offence that 
they had been the victims of blackmail. It is true that Rajk, Szalai, 
and Justus were threatened from the beginning with exposure, and 
once on the slippery path of espionage, the others, too, were unable 
to escape. But the answer to this is that, though they may have 
been forced to spy, they could not be forced to work their way up 
inside the Communist Party and the Government service. But they 
did work their way up because they were ambitious and greedy men. 
There is little enough to choose between these people, but Rajk 
did stand out from his fellows in certain respects during the trial. 
He played the role of the adventurer on the heroic scale-the man 
who staked everything on a throw of the dice, lost, and would now 
meet his debt like a gentleman. He refused to plead for mercy 
and did not support his lawyer's appeal to a higher court. But Rajk 
was not a gentleman, and the public prosecutor had a penetrating 
remark on the subject: 
"What sort of people, what sort of group is this?" he asked. "In 
the dock there are mean, petty sneaks and big political agents; but 
this difference between Ognjenovich and Laszlo Rajk, for instance, 
is only a matter of quantity and not of quality; for Laszlo Rajk 
began his career not as the candidate for the premiership of the 
counter-revolution, not as a big political agent, but as a petty police 
informer. And, indeed, it is not this that is the real difference 
between the individuals accused, but the fact that there are among 
them common fascists who hate the people, like Palffy and Korondy, 
and there are among them some who practised the trade of the 
traitor, infiltrating into the labour movement. 
"A common feature is, however, that we are dealing with the 
scum of society, all of whom became what they are in the 'thirties 
in the atmosphere of growing fascism. Szonyi and Rajk, Justus and 
Szalai, at that time, were swept along to the fringe of the labour 
movement, but at the moment of the first trials they became traitors 
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because of their cowardly and vacillating characters and their root-
less personalities." 
It is difficult to understand why people expected, or pretend to 
expect, anything but abject confessions from men of this kind. What 
right has one to anticipate principled or consistent behaviour in such 
a situation from men whose lives have been nothing but incon-
sistency and a monstrous and total denial of every principle? Could 
one reasonably expect that Szalai, who gave away the plan for the 
escape from Satoraljaujhely prison, should suddenly become a man 
at his own trial and fight for those ideas of Tito's which he had 
claimed to believe in? 
Could one expect Rajk, whose treachery dated back to 1931, sud-
denly to be loyal enough to his fellow-conspirators to refuse to give 
them away? He had given his fellow-Communists away to the 
police for eighteen years: why should he scruple over Brankov and 
Palffy now? Could one expect a man like Palffy, trained by the 
fascists and professing an admiration for Mussolini, to make a 
spirited defence of capitalism in court, or even the fascism he be-
lieved in? The answer, surely, is that one is entitled to expect no 
such thing. 
The absurdities of the popular press on the question of the trial 
were far outstripped in the columns of the New Statesman and 
Nation-a journal which had shown some warmth for the idea of 
a new kind of Communism, Tito or Rajk Communism, and was 
perhaps disappointed to find little in the trial to corroborate this 
novel political development. Be that as it may, the New Statesman 
had the utmost difficulty in believing in the conspiracy at all, and 
thought it "very unlikely" that Rajk had worked for Horthy's 
political police in 1932. 
But why should this be unlikely? The history of the workers' 
movement is cluttered and befouled by the thousands of weak or 
bad men who have done just what Rajk did in Hetenyi's office 
back in 1931. And in regard to the question of evidence, one had 
not only Rajk's detailed confession, but the manifestly true cor-
roborative evidence of Lajos Bokor and another police officer of the 
108 . 
old regime, now in dignified if bloodstained retirement, who were 
actually present when Rajk signed his undertaking to spy. 
It would seem that the New Statesman has never learned, or 
chooses to ignore, the history of the past 250 years and more. For 
all of that history is punctuated with cases of betrayal and treachery, 
and very often on a scale far greater than the treachery of Rajk. 
Was not Danton himself found to have among his papers a letter 
from the British Foreign Office to the banker Perregaux, when he 
was arrested by the Convention? And Danton, both in the days of 
the French Revolution and in ours, is a far bigger figure than 
Laszlo Raj k. 
Was not the Chartist movement a constant victim of paid police 
provocateurs and spies-men who deliberately incited violence in 
order to provoke arrests, in exactly the way Raj k provoked the 
arrest of the Budapest building workers in 1935? 
Hasn't the French police in particular an unrivalled record in the 
realm of provocation and espionage in the working-class move-
ment? They had their spy Marcel Gitton as Organising Secretary 
of the French Communist Party for years. In tsarist Russia 
there were agents whose names have become household words for 
treachery and whose stories do not need to be retold here. In the 
Yugoslav Communist Party itself before the war there was Gorkic, 
General Secretary of the party and a police agent. If Gor kic had 
never been unmasked and had been the party's secretary today, no 
doubt the New Statesman would defend his Marxist integrity to the 
last drop of ink in their ink wells. 
There are some people who are singularly unwilling to learn a 
thing from history, even when history is in the act of repeating its 
lessons at dictation speed. 
It is of course true, and it is known by everyone who is honest 
in the matter, that the police always did and always will expend 
much time, ingenuity, and money in placing their agents in the 
ranks of the working-class movement, and primarily in the Com-
munist Party. In the United States, every time a new trial is rigged 
up against the Communists, another handful of agents are given 
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their orders and come trooping into the open to recite their miser-
able evidence. In the course of 1949 a round dozen of them were 
doing it at the trial of the party's twelve leaders. 
All this, coupled with the particular ease of planting agents during 
the turbulent times of pre-war illegality, followed by the Spanish 
War and then the Second World War, is evidence enough of the 
existence of police agents in the international Communist move-
ment. It is not surprising that they are there; it would be astonish-
ing if they were not. 
No, the New Statesman and many other people would have 
liked the Budapest proceedings to be the trial by a dominant group 
of Communists of a little band of noble heretics who believed in an 
alternative, but equally Communist, line of action. That would 
have pleased them because the holding of reservations, the putting 
of alternatives, the opposition to the Soviet Union, are, for them, 
the things that matter most. 
Perhaps it would, in the event, be better to let them have their 
way and admit for the sake of argument that Rajk and Tito and 
Rankovich, Szalai and Szonyi and Palffy and the whole gang are 
their kind of "independent Communists" after all. Unfortunately, 
the trial also proved that they were fascist police spies, traitors, 
American agents, and organisers of what would have been the 
bloodiest military putsch in even Hungary's history. If those are 
the sort of people the New Statesman wishes to clasp to its bosom, 
one can only tell it regretfully to go ahead and be careful of the 
bloodstains. 
Perhaps the last word here should be with the Public Prosecutor: 
"In connection with this case they ask in the Western countries: 
how did so many traitors get into the ranks of the revolutionary 
labour movement? It is ironic that the very people ask this who 
should be able to answer this question; that these spokesmen of the 
intelligence services who call us to account for these traitors are the 
very ones who sent them into our ranks for the international disso-
lution of the revolutionary movement. It is an old method to send 
hostile spies and provocateurs into the workers' parties. 
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"It may be asked why the workers' parties were not able to expose 
these traitors immediately. If only we had had in our hands the 
files which contained the lists I As is known, the dossiers of the 
Hungarian police are not at our disposal but at the disposal of the 
American intelligence service." 
In addition to the full confessions of the eight accused, supple-
mented by the indictment, the court heard a large variety of 
witnesses. 
Dr. Lajos Bokor and another police official gave evidence of Rajk's 
first betrayal in 1931: Dr. Ferenc Janosi, a former Captain in the 
legal department of the Horthy Army, gave evidence that he had 
been the prosecutor in the trial of Rajk at Sopronkohida in 1944. 
Istvan Stolte, the man whom Rajk had sent to Germany to contact 
Dr. Sombor-Schweinitzer and the Americans, gave an account 
of his activities. Dr. Szebenyi and Sandor Cseresnyes also gave 
evidence. 
The secret meeting at Paks and the love affair of Mrazovich 
were illuminated by the evidence of the little schoolteacher, Gyorgyi 
Tarisznyas, and by the aristocratic Mr. Antal Klein, who stamped 
into court in a state of indignation and perplexity. 
Among the other witnesses were Dezso Nemeth, the man who 
had spied in Moscow, Joszef Rex, Hegedus, Ivan Foldi, who had 
been the courier between Szonyi in Budapest and Allan Dulles in 
Berne, Kalman, and two members of Paul Justus's Trotskyist study 
group. 
A former Horthy police officer named Miklos Reti told how Szalai 
had been recruited as a police spy in 1933 at Pees. Mr. Reti had 
some difficulty in restraining his own understandable tendency 
while giving evidence to refer to Communists as "conspirators." He 
brought with him into court the smell of the old fascist police 
stations. 
Szalai was further discomfited by the appearance of that lieutenant 
of the reserve Lajos Lindenberg, who had been so savage at the 
time of the Satoraljaujhely prison break, but who now spoke in 
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such an awed whisper that the judge had to remind him to speak 
more loudly, as he had done when he was in charge of the jail. 
The court also heard Zivko Boarov, an arrogant and immaculate 
young man, who grinned at the audience as he prepared to confess 
to the murder of Milos Moich and recount Brankov's part in that 
action. 
And there was the evidence, too, of Ljubitsa Ribar, the girl who 
had not wanted to spy for Tito and had been kidnapped by the 
Yugoslav diplomats in Budapest. 
As the six days of hearings wore on, no one in court could 
reasonably doubt that a devastating case had been built up against 
the conspirators. And so, if there was any surprise at all at the 
sentences announced by the president of the court on Saturday, 
September 24, it was that they were not heavier. 
Six of the accused were found guilty in varying degrees, and 
the cases of Palffy and Korondy were referred for retrial to a mili-
tary court.· Laszlo Rajk, Tibor Szonyi, and Andras Szalai were 
condemned to death, and could scarcely have expected anything 
else. Lazar Brankov was condemned to life imprisonment, and the 
judge remarked that it would be for his own Yugoslav people to 
judge him further. Ognjenovich, who had been an agent in the 
Federation of South Slavs, received nine years. Paul Justus was 
sentenced for life. In Hungarian law, life imprisonment is nine-
teen years, reducible by good conduct to fifteen. 
In his concluding remarks, the Public Prosecutor had declared: 
"Why do they confess? Why don't they deny, or why don't they 
defend themselves? Because they have been exposed, because they 
know that they cannot help themselves by a denial. Their confes-
sions are the results not of regret, but of their exposure. Precisely 
because of this there is no extenuating circumstance. 
"There are no extenuating circumstances, only aggravating cir-
cumstances. When you mete out sentence to the treacherous gang 
leader Laszlo Rajk, do not forget Ferenc Rozsa and Zoltan Schon-
• At their military trial later, Palffy and Korondy were found guilty, together 
with Nemeth and another officer. All four were executed. 
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herz, whose death he brought about, and do not forget the betrayed 
building workers who were imprisoned. When you pass judgment 
upon Andras Szalai, remember the sixty-four revolutionaries who 
were killed in the prison of Satoraljaujhely and for whose death 
he is responsible. 
"When you judge Palffy and Korondy, think of their predecessors, 
of the officer murderers whom they were getting ready to imitate, 
of the officer murderers of 1919, the Pronays and the Ostenburgs. 
When you pass your sentence on Brankov, think of the hangman 
Rankovich, one of whose chief agents this man was, think of the 
suffering of the Yugoslav patriots. When you judge Szonyi, think 
of his masters, the American imperialists who wish to bring the 
Hungarian people to the fate of the suffering, bleeding people of 
Greece." 
On the day after the end of the proceedings, the newspapers of 
Hungary were full of appeals for a great effort to complete the 
Three-Year Plan under time, and it seemed as if the people under-
stood that this was the real answer to Rajk and his friends. 
113 
18. Tito's Police State 
WE ARE APPROACHING the end of this account of the Tito betrayal 
but there is one important chapter of the tragedy which remains to 
be told. It will be recalled that at the final secret meeting in the 
forest at Paks, Rajk was informed that Tito had worked out a plan 
to draw the people of Yugoslavia gradually out of the Socialist 
camp and into alliance with the imperialist powers. It is this 
process that we now have to examine. 
The phases of Yugoslav policy from the publication of the Infor-
mation Bureau's Resolution in June 1948, down to the open alliance 
with the Anglo-American bloc at the General Assembly of the 
United Nations in September 1949, can be clearly traced. At his 
trial, Rajk declared that Rankovich had outlined these steps to him 
at Paks. And since that meeting took place as far back as the 
autumn of 1948, it is clear that the later evolution of Yugoslav 
policy towards the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies 
was carefully premeditated. 
Immediately after the publication of the Resolution, the Central 
Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party issued a statement 
the burden of which was that there had been a dreadful misunder-
standing. Running through all the speeches of the Yugoslav leaders 
at this time was an appeal to Stalin to correct what, it was sug-
gested, was simply a sad mistake on the part of the Communist 
parties of the Information Bureau. In this period propaganda for 
Stalin and the Soviet Union inside Yugoslavia was kept at a high 
pitch. 
At the same time, one month after the publication of the Reso-
lution, the Yugoslav leaders did exactly what they had been criticised 
for not doing before. They brought their Communist Party brieRy 
into the open and held a congress. 
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But by now everything had been arranged in such a way that 
with very few exceptions, the hand-picked delegates would vote 
exactly as Tito required. And so it surprised no one when, after 
shouting "Hero Titol Hero Titol" for minutes on end, the congress 
confirmed the Tito-Rankovich clique in power and passed a reso-
lution, more in sorrow than in anger, upbraiding the Information 
Bureau. 
This first period lasted only a short while. It merged during the 
late summer of 1948 into a phase in which the Soviet Union was 
still presented as Yugoslavia's greatest friend, but an increasingly 
sharp attack was made on the Popular Democracies. All sorts of 
gross and silly accusations of revisionism were made, for reasons 
that we can now understand, against Hungary and Bulgaria. 
At this period the Yugoslav leaders were still spending some time 
in routine attacks on American imperialism; but they were to be 
the last. And from the late summer months of 1948 until the 
present day the whole of the lavish Yugoslav propaganda machine 
has been devoted to the task of destroying the love of the Yugoslav 
people for the Soviet Union. 
In January of 1949 Marshal Tito was referring in public speeches 
to the "dishonesty" of the neighbouring Communist parties, and 
hinting darkly at "grave consequences." By now the Yugoslav 
leaders were making the first tentative attacks on the Soviet Union, 
but to confuse the issue as thoroughly as possible they pretended 
to draw an absurd distinction between Stalin and the Soviet Com-
munist Party. Stalin, it appeared, was still good; the party was bad. 
By April the talk had become a good deal plainer. General 
Kreatitch, of the Yugoslav Army, declared at the People's Front 
Congress that "calumnies and fantastic inventions" were being put 
out by the Soviet Union. Learned talk was also heard at this time 
purporting to demonstrate that something had gone wrong with 
Moscow's Marxism. 
But soon the last remaining half-measures were abandoned. By 
the summer of 1949 Belgrade was producing the most violent, ill· 
intentioned and palpably false propaganda against the Soviet Union 
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and the Popular Democracies that could be found anywhere. There 
were repeated claims that Russia was planning an invasion; that the 
Soviet Union had made a call for civil war in Yugoslavia; that 
there was no difference between Churchill and Stalin (this last, 
in a Navy Day telegram from Rear-Admiral Juro Loncharevich, 
was going a little far for the time being. The newspaper Politika 
published it, but Borba cut it out of their version of the wire). 
Throughout this campaign, the most hysterical and vicious of all 
the publicists had been Milovan Djilas and Moshe Pijade. Writing 
from the heart of Tito's police State in September of 1949, Djilas 
accused the U.S.S.R. of organising "the arrest and killing of inno-
cent people." And although the Press which he controlled had not 
had a harsh word to say for American imperialism for months, 
Djilas, in a passage of unique unconscious humour, criticised the 
Russians for no longer attacking the Tsar! 
"It is not accidental that in their propaganda, criticism of Tsarism 
and Tsarist imperial policy has almost disappeared," cried Djilas 
in triumph. 
The purpose of this careful propaganda campaign was not only 
to prepare the minds of the Yugoslav people for a new political 
orientation. Tito also intended to develop close economic relations 
with the West, and knew that moves to accept American loans 
would be regarded with the greatest suspicion by people who had 
earlier been told by Tito himself that the Marshall Plan spelt eco-
nomic and political slavery. 
By August, Tito felt sufficiently sure of himself to declare that he 
would welcome a U.S. loan. At the beginning of September he 
received in Belgrade an investigating mission from the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development. This mission 
toured the country, prying into its economic affairs in much the 
same way that the imperial powers investigate the commercial pos-
sibilities of a new colonial territory into which it is proposed to sink 
some hard cash. 
Both Britain and the U.S. made it clear that credits would be 
granted to Yugoslavia. During September the U.S. State Depart-
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ment authorised the sale to Tito of a U.S. steel mill. A 20 million 
dollar loan was negotiated through the U.S. Export-Import Bank. 
The International Bank got ready to announce a loan for Yugo-
slav timber development. During November Britain and the U.S. 
agreed to supply Yugoslavia with aircraft and aviation fuel. 
The culminating point came at the General Assembly of the 
United Nations at Lake Success in September. There, for the first 
time, all pretence was finally dropped. Not only did the Yugoslav 
delegation under Kardelj vote with the Anglo-American bloc. For 
most of the time they were leading the attack on the Soviet Union, 
and Kardelj's speeches were received with glee and hearty applause 
by the British and American delegations, who brought Yugoslavia 
into the Security Council in defiance of Soviet wishes. 
They were not, of course, quite as gleeful as they pretended. For 
it would have been so much better for them if the Information 
Bureau's Resolution had never been published, if Tito had managed 
to maintain the bluff and stay in the socialist camp, and if he had 
managed to win Hungary and maybe some other People's Democ-
racies away from Socialism and into that Balkan federation that 
Churchill dreamed of, and the plotting for which had been started 
by the British mission in 1943. 
On September 28 the Soviet Union sent a note to Yugoslavia 
pointing out that the Rajk trial had revealed that Yugoslavia was 
pursuing a policy hostile to the U.S.S.R. This fact tore the Soviet-
Yugoslav Friendship Pact to pieces, and therefore the Soviet Union 
felt herself to be free from its obligations. 
Here we must say a word about that Colonel-General Arso 
Jovanovich who, in the days of the war, supported Hebrang and 
Zujovich in their stand against Tito and his group. 
Jovanovich, like Hebrang and Zujovich, supported the criticisms 
of the Information Bureau. He had been Chief-of-Staff of the 
Partisan Army, and a man of great personal popularity. He was 
thus a constant menace to Tito and his friends. The world was not 
surprised to hear therefore, in August, 1948, that Arso Jovanovich 
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had been "shot while trying illegally to cross the frontier." It was 
one of Rankovich's pet euphemisms for murder. What Brankov 
had revealed in his Szabad Nep article was true. 
Jovanovich was one of the most courageous, because one of the 
most exposed of the Yugoslav Marxists who had started the arduous 
and dangerous task of breaking the grip of the Trotskyists and 
re--establishing a genuine Communist Party in Yugoslavia. There 
were many thousands like him who have either been shot out of 
hand or thrown into Rankovich's jails. Tito's Yugoslavia has now 
become a thorough-going police State, and the police machine is 
not directed against the former fascists and the remains of the 
Yugoslav capitalists. It is directed against the genuine representa-
tives of the working-class movement. But for every Communist 
jailed or killed others have arisen to continue the fight. 
It is not within the scope of this book to detail the heroic work 
of the new, illegal Yugoslav Communist Party, nor to show in 
detail the appalling hazards with which it is faced. But no 
mention of Tito's Yugoslavia could be complete without this brief 
reference and tribute to its work in the most dangerous and 
difficult sector of the class struggle in the world today-a sector as 
dangerous to the fighters for socialism as was Hitler's Germany. 
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19. The Lessons of the Trial 
MANY WESTERN observers at the Rajk trial adopted a position that 
can perhaps be summed up as follows: Rajk and his associates were 
clearly guilty of both espionage and treason. Their confessions were 
genuine and probably based upon irrefutable proofs. Rajk no 
doubt wanted to be dictator of Hungary, and was willing to allow 
Tito to help him in the matter. Tito for his part was not averse to 
an obedient and friendly Hungary. But two things at the trial were 
impossible to accept. Firstly, it is absurd to charge the leaders of 
Yugoslavia with being either anti-socialists or American agents, or 
with pursuing a pro-American policy in the Balkans. Tito's actions 
during and since the war make these things impossible. Secondly, 
to charge Allan Dulles and the u.S. intelligence service with plot-
ting for the establishment in Budapest of an "American" govern-
ment is nothing but a serious symptom of spy-fever. And as for 
Mr. Dulles's activities in 1944, all he was doing was helping to win 
the war against the Germans. 
A characteristic exponent of this viewpoint, and I believe I have 
given it fairly, was Mr. Stephen White, the representative of the 
New York Herald Tribune at the trial. 
Mr. White found no difficulty in accepting the genuineness of the 
confessions and the evidence of guilt. On these matters he had this 
to say (New York Herald Tribune, September 30): 
"The matter of drugs and torture, for example, can be disposed 
of at once. Not only is there no physical evidence to show that the 
eight men have been subjected to unusual treatment (at least in 
the recent past) but there is in addition ample evidence to suggest 
that they have not. 
"The most convincing phase of this derives from the attitude of 
the defendants. To take extreme cases, the chief defendant, Laszlo 
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Rajk, was the most arresting and the most commanding figure in 
the court. His record showed him to be a man of great abilities 
and acute perceptions, a proud man and a bold one. His appearance 
bore this out, item by item. There was on the other hand, Andras 
Szalai, a self-admitted police spy and one whose previous activities 
were accessible for the record. His past showed him to be a most 
unattractive sniveller-in court he was exactly that. 
"Each of the defendants, in fact, was a personality. The two 
Army officers behaved like Army officers; the intellectual dissident 
behaved like one. Accordingly, if one is to believe in drugs or 
torture as the impelling force behind the confessions, one must 
believe that the Communists have invented a drug, or discovered 
a torture, that will lead a man to confess, make it utterly certain 
that he will not renounce his confession in open court, and yet will 
leave every other phase of his personality unaffected. This is a good 
deal to believe, and the best comment is that no one at the trial, 
so far as this reporter knows, is willing to give the theory a mo-
ment's credence." 
To this, Mr. White added that he believed that Rajk and his 
associates were guilty of the charges brought against them. 
But at this point commence the reservations of both Mr. White 
and a number of other people who take, or pretend to take, an 
altogether naive view of British and American policy. 
They claim that in 1944 and 1945 the British and U.s. intelli-
gence services could not have had the foresight, the cunning, or the 
political acumen to plan such a development as the Rajk conspiracy 
in Hungary and the Tito betrayal in Yugoslavia. 
They are underestimating the qualities of the British and Amer-
ican bourgeoisie. Do they imagine that a class that is capable of 
hoisting itself into power, of conquering and holding down a vast 
segment of the earth's surface, of maintain:ng its privileges and 
position at a moment when the workers in every part of the globe 
are turning against capitalism and striving to conquer power them-
selves, and of fighting a stubborn rear-guard action in Europe long 
after history has sounded the knell of the old order and proclaimed 
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the new-do they seriously imagine that such a class cannot or will 
not evolve policies of the utmost unscrupulousness and cunning~ 
but will seek to rely upon political simplicity and kindness alone? 
Here again the lessons of the past are ignored. The history of 
every country in Europe is packed with examples of intrigue and 
cunning in no way inferior to the intrigue of Mr. Dulles and the cun-
ning of the O.S.S. It is popular to suggest, and Mr. White suggests it,. 
that only in the Balkans does one find spies and provocateurs. But 
the lending libraries of Britain are full of the memoirs of British 
agents in the Balkans, and many of them get their orders in London 
or Washington. 
Is it impossible that a 100 per cent American could participate in 
a plot which involves the use of fascists for the purposes of political 
assassination? 
Come, come, Mr. White. No one will seriously believe that such 
considerations play the slightest part where a crucial struggle be-
tween capitalism and socialism is concerned. For that is what we 
are here examining. 
Mr. Churchill and the Foreign Office were capable of using the 
dregs of Europe in their war of intervention against the young 
Soviet Republic. Why should they not use Europe's dregs now 
against Socialism in Eastern Europe? The Americans are using 
the fascists of Japan and the Nazis of Western Germany in building 
their famous bulwarks against Bolshevism. Why should they be 
more squeamish in Hungary? 
But what of Tito and his friends? Is it really so impossible that 
the men who fought the Germans, bitterly attacked the West on 
every international issue, nationalised the means of production,. 
placarded Belgrade with photographs of Lenin and Stalin, and 
behaved, broadly, as Communists, should now be the spearhead of 
the imperialist attack in Eastern Europe? 
If this is impossible, so, are a number of other things in history. 
Napoleon is impossible, so is Joseph Fouche, so are Ramsay Mac-
Donald, Ernest Bevin, Jacques Doriot, and Benito Mussolini. Every 
turncoat there ever was becomes an impossibility and every betrayal 
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a myth. But as we know, there were turncoats and betrayals, be-
cause the dangers and temptations of a pitiless class struggle have 
always produced them and produce them still. 
Napoleon Bonaparte, who rose to power in the great turmoil of 
the French Revolution, betrayed the principles of the Revolution 
and bequeathed us the word "Bonapartism." Fouche, who served 
five masters and betrayed them all, sent to the scaffold under the 
Monarchy the men who had been his boon companions under the 
Republic. Ramsay MacDonald betrayed the British working class. 
Ernest Bevin has long since abandoned the fundamental principles 
of the British labour movement. Doriot was a member of the 
French Communist Party, turned traitor, and became a fascist. 
Mussolini had been a Socialist in his youth. 
Is an this utterly irrelevant? Has it suddenly become impossible 
in the year 1949, for anyone to abandon his principles or for anyone 
to have professed views which all along were not his own? 
Perhaps the word "Bonapartism" is the most convenient and 
helpful for us in seeking to analyse the case of Tito. For Bona-
partism means the degeneration of the revolution into dictatorship 
and terror, the abandonment of principles and the ending of free-
dom. This is precisely what has happened under Tito's rule in 
Yugoslavia. And there is surely enough evidence even within these 
pages to indicate the nature of that downward progression and its 
more salient and easily recognisable features. 
It may be said that even granting Tito's fall towards fascism (for 
Bonapartism can take only this form under the conditions of the 
twentieth century), it is unlikely that he would become an instru-
ment of American policy in Europe. 
The answer, surely, is that there is no modus vivendi, and Tito 
knows there is none, for a State which refuses to co-operate either 
with the Soviet Union and the newly developing socialist countries, 
or with the Anglo-American bloc. And since the Marshall Plan 
and the Atlantic Pact have now provided evidence in abundance 
of precisely what "co-operation" with the West actually means, it 
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becomes unthinkable that Tito will have any choice but to do pre-
cisely what Washington requires of him. 
It may be added that if the work of the Yugoslav U.D.B. on be-
half of the Americans is not proof of servile obedience of a most 
advanced kind, then it is difficult to know what would be regarded 
as satisfactory evidence. 
But one has no need to require of the sceptics that they satisfy 
themselves with this admittedly compelling but nevertheless circum-
stantial evidence alone. For in establishing American responsibility 
in the matter we find coming to our assistance none other than two 
of the most powerful policy-makers in the United States. 
Firstly, we have Mr. George Kennan, Chief of the Policy Plan-
ning Division of the U.S. State Department. Mr. Kennan, an 
"expert" on the Soviet Union, was the author during 1947 of an 
article in a leading U.S. review which set out the broad lines of 
American strategy in the struggle against Communism. The article 
was signed "X," but its real authorship was revealed almost at once 
and never denied. 
Mr. Kennan expounded the conception that the Soviet Union 
must be "contained" diplomatically and militarily by the U.S. and 
her allies, and that the capitalist powers must then work for the 
internal disintegration of the social systems of the Soviet Union and 
her associated powers. 
It would be absurd to suggest, if this was the State Department's 
policy-and who can deny that subsequent history confirms the fact 
that it was ?-that the State and War Departments would not do 
everything in their power to hasten the hoped-for disintegration. 
Here we come to a speech of Mr. John Foster Dulles, our second 
witness, in the spring of 1948. Mr. Dulles is chief Republican foreign 
policy expert and has been closely associated with the directors of 
United States foreign policy since the beginning of the Truman 
doctrine. 
In his 1948 speech, Mr. Dulles revealed the existence of a certain 
"Plan X" (the letter appears to exercise a cabalistic fascination for 
American politicians). This plan, which involved the expenditure 
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of a greatly increased intelligence budget, was designed to develop 
in Eastern Europe an extensive and efficient espionage network. It 
was openly stated in these terms. And the theme was taken up by 
other responsible authorities in Washington at the time. 
What was this espionage for ? To strengthen the existing political 
structure, or to weaken it ? To put Standard Oil and Shell and Dun· 
lop and the western banks back into Hungary and the other Popu. 
lar Democracies, or to keep them out? The answer, of course, is 
too obvious to need stating. 
Since such American plans do exist, then, what is there about the 
Rajk trial that is impossible to accept? Surely the trial is nothing but 
the revelation of one important segment of a programme that ex-
tends to everyone of the Popular Democracies, is part of the general 
strategy of hostility to and eventual war against the Soviet Union, 
and is capitalism's desperate and degraded way of defending its last 
European ditches. 
That being so, it is easy to see why the two major events described 
in these pages were first-class disasters for the imperial powers. 
The exposure of the Tito gang in the Resolution of the Commu-
nist Information Bureau isolated the nest of traitors and ended f~r 
good this centre of Anglo-American plotting inside the Communist 
movement. And the trial of Rajk both scotched the plan for Hun-
gary and exposed in full for the first time the ramifications of Amer-
ican-Yugoslav strategy. 
In this matter, as in others of recent years, the Americans have 
been the inheritors of a British policy. As in Greece, where Mr. 
Churchill first sent British troops to smash the Left and then left 
it to the Americans to finish the job, so in Yugoslavia, British 
intelligence commenced the operation and bequeathed their achieve-
ments to the Americans. Mr. Churchill's military mission laid the 
foundation; Mr. Dulles, the O.S.S., and the U.s. State Department 
built upon it. And the American banks are now sending their rep-
resentatives into Yugoslavia to scrape up what financial pickings 
they can by the side of the more important political revenue pro-
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vided for the State Department by Tito's intrigues among his 
neighbours, his betrayal of democratic Greece, and his help for the 
Anglo-American bloc at the United Nations. 
The Rajk trial has thus demonstrated anew the dishonourable 
role played by Britain in the American drive to smash Socialism 
and prepare a new war. 
It has become fashionable in certain circles in Britain, as we had 
occasion to remark in an earlier chapter, to hail Tito as a new type 
of "independent Communist." A number of persons, including 
some who should know better, have permitted themselves to become 
the guests of this blood-stained tyrant since his guilt has been 
demonstrated. 
But what more does one need than the revelations of the Rajk 
trial and the contents of the newspapers of the last six months to 
convince one that Tito's Yugoslavia has degenerated into a fascist 
state? 
It is all very well for politicians and journalists with Left reputa-
tions to return from Tito's palatial residence and quote him on the 
subject of human dignity and justice. But what of Rankovich and 
the O.Z.N.A.? What of the murder of Arso Jovanovich and the 
activities of the U.D.E.? 
It is all very well for these visitors to come back and declare that 
Tito is not joining the Western camp, because he took them on one 
side and told them that he wasn't. But what of the U.N. General 
Assembly, and the mission of the World Bank? 
It is all very well, too, to suggest that Yugoslavia's quarrel with 
the Soviet Union is the classic quarrel of the small state which seeks 
to rid itself of the domination of the large. But what exactly was this 
domination? These Eastern European countries are not forced to 
cripple themselves with huge war budgets, as the Atlantic Pact coun-
tries are forced by Washington. When the Eastern European 
countries accept loans or trade agreements these are of a character 
which assists the whole economy of the country and does not involve 
the sort of political conditions imposed by the Marshall Plan. 
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Some of those people who woo Tito now and still call themselves 
the friends of progress are going to look uncommonly silly when the 
Tito gang gives even more irresistible evidence both of its brutality 
and its dependence on imperialism. The best advice one can offer 
them, perhaps, is to pull themselves together before it is too late. 
And that advice pays them the honour of assuming that their sup-
port for Tito is an error and not a manoeuvre. In many cases it is 
undoubtedly the latter. 
It should be clearly understood that there is no such thing as this 
middle way of Tito's. Either states are based upon an existing or 
developing socialist system, or they are based upon a capitalist sys-
tem. If the former, they must form part of the peace bloc with the 
Soviet Union at its head, because without the power and assistance 
of the Soviet Union they will inevitably be gobbled up by the ever-
watchful imperialist powers. If the latter, they are bound by the 
logic of political and economic facts to be drawn into the orbit of 
the most powerful capitalist state in the world-the United States. 
Whether their political system is bourgeois (Western) democracy, 
as in Britain, or dictatorship and the rule of the police, as in Spain 
and Greece and Yugoslavia, they are still dependent for their sur-
vival upon the good-will of the United States. 
Yugoslavia's industry has been largely taken over by the state. 
But these nationalisations, without democracy and genuine popular 
control, become State capitalism. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, 
after all, nationalised or controlled decisive sectors of their industry. 
Further, Tito's policy of encouraging the kulaks in the countryside 
is rapidly rebuilding the capitalist structure in the villages. 
There is no doubt at all that under the Tito gang Yugoslav 
"socialism" will degenerate rapidly in the near future and their 
supporters will not be able to maintain very much longer their pro-
testations of attachment to Marxism and socialism. This would 
mean a bleak and terrible future for the Yugoslav people, one of 
the most energetic, heroic and generous peoples in Europe, but for 
the fact that among them the forces of resistance are arising and 
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growing stronger as they learn the lessons of their experience. And 
for the progressive movement ev~rywhere the same lessons have to 
be applied, for the choice today can only be between the front of 
socialism and peace led by the Soviet Union and the front of im-
perialism and war. 
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